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Comments
STUDENT-ATHLETES’ PUSH FOR COMPENSATION:
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF ALSTON V. NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
(ALSTON II), 958 F.3D 1239
(9TH CIR. 2020).
I. TIPPING OFF: INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law is an important area of law and is most associated
with companies involved in consumer product markets.1 Despite a
focus on consumer product markets, antitrust issues regularly dip
into more nuanced areas such as the sports world.2 These issues
make more than just a cameo in the sports world, as professional
sports have experienced their share of antitrust suits.3 Additionally,
college sports have been the subject of several antitrust lawsuits; in
particular, the competitiveness of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) rules and regulations have been challenged
frequently.4 Support for student-athlete compensation has been a
1. See Antitrust Laws, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., https://www.uschamber.com/
antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/ZRK4-LUSY] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (explaining function of antitrust laws is to provide for “a free and open market economy”
as well as “healthy competition” that allows for “lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation”); see also James Chen, Understanding Antitrust Laws, I N V E S T O P E D I A (May 29, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/antitrust-law.asp [https://perma.cc/
36UB-H93P] (describing goal of antitrust laws to ensure fair competition by quashing activities like “bid rigging, price fixing, and monopolies”).
2. See Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, USL EGAL , https://sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-and-labor-law-issues-in-sports/ [https://perma.cc/
G4DS-3SEU] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (discussing cases Flood v. Kuhn, in which
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) player Curtis C. Flood sued MLB for antitrust violations, Wood v. National Basketball Association, in which National Baskeball Association (“NBA”)’s salary cap, draft, restricted free agency were challenged).
3. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (holding baseball has
longstanding exemption from antitrust laws that must be upheld in accordance
with stare decisis); see also, e.g., Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 963
(2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act challenges made against salary
cap, player draft, free agency rules of NBA); Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football
League, 323 F.2d 124, 134 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding plaintiff, American Football
League (“AFL”), failed to demonstrate monopolization by defendant NFL).
4. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) [hereinafter Board of Regents] (holding NCAA restrictions
on member schools televising college football games were anticompetitive behavior); see also, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079
(9th Cir. 2015) (“NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be
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recent topic of controversy and conversation, receiving support
from many different proponents interested in securing compensation for student-athletes for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses (collectively “NIL”).5 Despite growing support, however,
the NCAA has been the greatest opposition to this compensation;
the Association has insisted that its rules are the best for the sake of
amateur sports and has presented obstacles to prevent student-athlete compensation by threatening athletes with legal challenges.6
Student-athletes are seeking compensation from the NCAA, a
billion-dollar business that is profiting from their labor and skills.7
Laws and rules allowing student-athletes to profit off of their NIL
and be compensated for their performance on university teams
would allow some athletes to finally make money without having to
play at a professional level.8 Because a very small minority of student-athletes end up in professional leagues, collegiate compensatested in the crucible of the Rule of Reason.”); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding court dismissal of claim was
proper given plaintiffs failed to properly identify labor market for student-athletes); Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 432–34 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding NCAA rules for recruitment of student athletes did not fall under
Sherman Act’s restraint of trade provision); Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding Sherman Act did not apply to
NCAA’s eligibility rules).
5. See Andrew Yang, NCAA Should Pay Athletes, YANG 2020 https://
2020.yang2020.com/policies/ncaa-pay-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/789W-VJCY]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (discussing how NCAA sports entertainment should
result in athletes’ appropriate compensation given revenues athletes generate for
schools); see also Matt Norlander, Fair Pay to Play Act: States Bucking NCAA to Let
Athletes Be Paid for Name, Image, Likeness, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:43 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/fair-pay-to-play-act-states-bucking-ncaa-to-let-athletes-be-paid-for-name-image-likeness/ [https://perma.cc/
WQ53-RHWS] (noting California’s passage of pay to play bill, which has created
“ripple effect” in other states introducing pay to play bills, leading to greater push
against NCAA amateurism rules).
6. See NCAA Board of Governors, NCAA Responds to California Senate Bill 206:
Measure Would Upend Level Playing Field for All Student-Athletes, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206 [https://perma.cc/Y9CMBSTS] (arguing NIL compensation for student-athletes would erase distinction between college versus professional athletics, leaving California schools with unfair
recruiting advantages by allowing compensation); see also Andrew Smalley, Pay for
Play for College Athletes?, NCSL BLOG (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/
2019/09/30/pay-for-play-for-college-athletes.aspx [https://perma.cc/RHW652UC] (discussing NCAA’s long-standing interest in preserving amateur nature of
college athletics by preventing payment of student-athletes).
7. See Smalley, supra note 66 (“College athletes earn billions of dollars annually for their schools, television networks, apparel companies and the National Collegiate Athletic Association.”).
8. See Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. Athletes Could Be Paid Under New California Law,
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/sports/college-athletes-paid-california.html [https://perma.cc/L4QG-Q6JE] (discussing
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tion may reconcile for the countless–and often excessive–hours that
student-athletes spend doing work for their sports each week compared to the time they spend doing academic work.9
However, the NCAA has perceived amateur sports as
threatened by the emergence of laws allowing for student-athlete
compensation.10 In the past, the NCAA was given express instruction from the United States Supreme Court that it has “ample latitude” to structure rules as necessary in order to maintain the
“revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”11 Accordingly,
the NCAA has also argued in court about the need to preserve differences between amateur and professional sports—and the need
for restrictive bylaws to do so.12 Underlying NCAA arguments
against player compensation, the NCAA has shown concern that allowing for student-athlete compensation would diminish demand
for college athletics because it is the amateurism that the NCAA
claims is driving demand.13
While these issues have been litigated before, they were again
litigated in front of the Ninth Circuit in an antitrust suit waged
against the NCAA in Alston v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
(Alston II),14 which focused on issues similar to previous antitrust
quote from former college athlete Hayley Hodson who stated “college is the only
time [many athletes] have to profit off their hard-earned athletic successes”).
9. See Peter Jacobs, Here’s the Insane Amount of Time Student-Athletes Spend On
Practice, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2015, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
college-student-athletes-spend-40-hours-a-week-practicing-2015-1 [https://
perma.cc/SHB8-R79S] (presenting data showing average time spent on athletic
activities every week is over thirty hours); see also Jasmine Harris, It’s Naı̈ve to Think
College Athletes Have Time for School, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 9, 2018, 6:55 AM),
https://theconversation.com/its-naive-to-think-college-athletes-have-time-forschool-100942 [https://perma.cc/CZ4U-K9KH] (indicating college athletes spend
triple amount of time on athletics per week compared to academics).
10. See NCAA Board of Governors, supra note 6 (arguing NIL compensation
for student-athletes will blur line between collegiate versus professional athletics).
11. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (stating NCAA must be
given ability to structure, control, enforce its own rules to preserve amateurism at
collegiate level).
12. See Edward H. Grimmett, Comment, NCAA Amateurism and Athletics: A Perfect Marriage or a Dysfunctional Relationship? - An Antitrust Approach to Student-Athlete
Compensation, 30 TOURO L. REV. 823, 831 (2014) (acknowledging NCAA arguments
in past litigation favor restrictive regulations).
13. See Andy Schwarz, The Fallacy Of Fragile Demand for “Amateurism”, ATHLETIC
DIR. U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/the-fallacy-of-fragile-demand-foramateurism/ [https://perma.cc/3ZG9-9GLB] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021) (discussing NCAA’s conception college sports’ amateur status drives consumer demand).
14. Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter Alston II].
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litigation in both the Supreme Court and circuit courts.15 The
most pervasive issue of the litigation was whether the NCAA’s rules
that restrict education-related benefits are anti-competitive behavior.16 Notably, the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction includes California,
which at the time of the litigation had recently passed a “pay for
play” law that would allow NIL compensation for student-athletes
participating in NCAA athletics.17 It is unclear how—or even if—
this new legislation influenced the court’s decision in Alston II or its
later affirmation at the Supreme Court; at the very least the Ninth
Circuit decision, collectively with the California play for pay law,
demonstrates a level of consistency among this geographic area in
its recent movement toward student-athlete compensation at the
collegiate level.18 As other states have followed California’s lead
and pursued NIL laws for student-athletes, the Ninth Circuit was
likewise poised to become a guide for antitrust litigation regarding
issues of student-athlete pay.19 In Alston II, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court injunction of NCAA rules restricting education-related benefits, as the Ninth Circuit agreed that the rules were
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act)—the
NCAA rules were deemed unlawful restraints on trade.20
Nevertheless, many open questions remained as Alston II
awaited a hearing in the Supreme Court, which foreshadowed a decision with nationwide implications for amateurism, student-athlete
pay, and collegiate athletics in general.21 On June 21, 2021, the
15. For further discussion of other examples of antitrust litigation against the
NCAA, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1243 (noting case centered on order enjoining
NCAA rule that restricted education-related benefits for student-athletes).
17. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (a)(1) (West 2021) (discussing law’s purpose to prohibit institutions of higher education from disallowing compensation of
college athletes for name, image, or likeness); see also Blinder, supra note 8 (noting
California’s bill allows players to “strike endorsement deals and hire agents” while
acknowledging California Governor who signed bill into law, Gavin Newsom’s,
comments about NCAA’s no pay policy as “farce”).
18. For further discussion of California’s pay for play legislation, see supra
note 17 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Alston II, see infra notes
32–57, 168–282 and accompanying text. For further discussion of O’Bannon, see
infra notes 149–161 and accompanying text.
19. See Norlander, supra note 5 (noting pressure California’s passage of pay to
play bill has placed on other states).
20. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1265–66 (holding district court’s conclusion
about anticompetitive nature of NCAA’s limits on education-related benefits was
correct as NCAA limits “do not ‘play by the Sherman Act’s rules’ ” (quoting
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015))).
21. See Robert Barnes & Rick Maese, Supreme Court Will Hear NCAA Dispute
Compensation for Student-Athletes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-ncaa/2020/12/16/
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Supreme Court released its opinion in NCAA v. Alston (Alston III)22
and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Gorsuch.23
This Note focuses on Alston II as decided by the Ninth Circuit.24 It discusses the facts of the case, the background of the law
applied, the reasoning and analysis of the court, and the impact the
decision will have.25 Section Two of this Note describes the facts of
the case, paying special attention to the focuses of the district court
and the Ninth Circuit throughout litigation up until the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the lower district court.26 Section Three, the
background section, discusses antitrust law being applied in Alston
II.27 Specifically, this Section addresses federal statutes surrounding antitrust law, traditional antitrust case law, NCAA-related antitrust case law, a circuit court split (now resolved by the Supreme
Court opinion), and newly enacted or proposed pay for play laws at
the state level.28 Next, Section Four describes the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Alston II and discusses the court’s reasoning behind its
decision.29 This Note then proceeds to Section Five, which focuses
on critical analysis and analyzes the court’s logic and conclusions.30
90f20dbc-3fa9-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html [https://perma.cc/S5FZUWFH] (recognizing Supreme Court accepted petition from NCAA to hear Alston
when Supreme Court has not heard college athletics antitrust issues since Board of
Regents in 1984, which indicates shifting landscape for college sports with regards
to new NIL laws for student-athletes, in addition to general push against traditional
NCAA amateurism rules).
22. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) [hereinafter Alston III].
23. See National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, SCOTUSBLOG, https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-collegiate-athletic-association-v-alston/ [https://perma.cc/BD88-YJY2] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (listing case details like date of argument, date of opinion, vote total, opinion author).
24. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston II, see infra
notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of Alston II, see infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of facts of Alston II, see infra notes 32–57 and accompanying text.
27. For further discussion of background information on antitrust law, see
infra notes 62–167 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion of antitrust statutes, see infra notes 62–68, 75–86
and accompanying text. For further discussion of general antitrust case law, see
infra notes 87–102 and accompanying text. For further discussion of NCAA-related antitrust case law, see infra notes 103–161 and accompanying text. For further discussion of emerging pay for play laws, see infra notes 162–167 and
accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of a narrative analysis of Alston II, see infra notes
168–255 and accompanying text.
30. For further discussion of a critical analysis of Alston II, see infra notes
257–282 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

5

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

40

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 35

Finally, this Note concludes with Section Six, an impact section in
which it considers consequences of the Alston II decision by the
Ninth Circuit for the field of law and for collegiate sports as well as
the consequences of its affirmation in Alston III.31
II. SETTING THE PACE

OF

PLAY: LOOKING AT ALSTON’S FACTS

Alston II, prior to being argued in front of the Ninth Circuit,
was brought as Alston v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (Alston
I)32 before the Northern District of California in March of 2019.33
The Plaintiffs in Alston I (who became respondents in Alston II)
were both current and former student-athletes challenging current
NCAA rules that put limits on compensation receivable by studentathletes and alleging that those limits violate federal antitrust law.34
Meanwhile, the Defendants—the NCAA and several of its conferences—contended that its limits were actually procompetitive given
their effects of preserving amateurism in college sports and
strengthening academic communities by including studentathletes.35
In evaluating the claims, the district court stated a brief factual
history of the NCAA as a league, mentioning that while the associa31. For further discussion of Alston II’s impact, see infra notes 283–323 and
accompanying text.
32. See Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 2019) [hereinafter Alston I] (ruling in favor of student-athlete Plaintiffs
against NCAA while issuing injunction against NCAA amateurism rule).
33. See generally id. (noting district court case was heard in Northern District of
California).
34. See id. at 1061–62 (discussing Plaintiffs’ backgrounds, contention that
NCAA student-athlete compensatory restrictions result in anticompetitive
behavior).
35. See id. at 1061–62 & 1062 n.1 (noting Defendants include NCAA plus
eleven of its conferences taking part in college football or basketball, including
Pac-12, Big 12, SEC). The court did resolve some issues at summary judgment and
ultimately presided over the remaining issues in a bench trial. See id. at 1062 (discussing court’s summary judgment ruling plus subsequent trial). The Defendants
also made both issue and claim preclusion arguments to try to stave off the litigation, stating that the challenge by Plaintiffs was precluded due to the issues being
materially the same and already being settled. See id. at 1092–93 (“As a threshold
matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not shown that this case is not precluded by the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in O’Bannon II.”). The district court stated
that there were material factual differences that defeated the preclusion arguments and required consideration under the rule of reason. See id. at 1095–96
(“The material factual differences discussed above defeat Defendants’ preclusion
arguments and warrant examining the conduct challenged in this case under the
Rule of Reason . . . . In sum, because Plaintiffs raise new antitrust challenges to
conduct affecting a different class, in a different time period, relating to rules and
forms of compensation that are not the same as those challenged in O’Bannon,
the claims in this case are not precluded by O’Bannon II.”).
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tion was originally founded in 1905 for the purpose of regulating
college football, it has evolved to “govern many aspects of athletic
competitions among NCAA member schools” and it currently has
some eleven hundred member schools.36 The court then mentioned that the NCAA rules are enacted by a Board of Directors and
noted that there has been an evolution of NCAA rules regulating
benefits and compensation that student-athletes may receive.37
While student-athletes were originally prohibited from receiving
even scholarships, new rules in 1956 were implemented to allow
“grants-in-aid,” or athletic scholarships, for student-athletes.38 The
court also recognized that the NCAA generates roughly one billion
dollars each year in total revenues.39
The district court moved to analyze the challenged NCAA regulations under the rule of reason analysis, which exists for “agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed.”40 The court noted that Plaintiffs
were only focusing on rules regulating compensation and benefits
that student-athletes may receive as NCAA athletes.41 After doing a
thorough analysis of the alleged anticompetitive rules, the district
court entered judgment for the Plaintiffs, stating that “[r]estricting
36. See id. at 1062–63 (noting association’s evolution from single issue to
broad governance overseeing three Divisions, including eleven hundred schools).
37. See id. at 1063 (discussing process, history of NCAA rule enactment).
38. See id. (noting 1906 bylaws of NCAA’s former body Intercollegiate Athletic
Association (“IAA”) prohibited receipt of any compensation in exchange for participation in college sports, including scholarships, but new rules in 1956 gave
schools permission to award “grants-in-aid” to student-athletes). While the 1956
rules did allow student-athletes to receive scholarships, the rules did limit the size
of grant-in-aid that schools could offer, thus stopping any financial aid beyond
normal education expenses. See id. (explaining origins, limitations of NCAA grantin-aid awards for student-athletes). However, in 1976, the definition of grant-in-aid
was amended to limit “educational expenses to include only ‘tuition and fees,
room and board and required course-related books.’ ” See id. (summarizing NCAA
grant-in-aid definition following rule amendment in 1976).
39. See id. (“The NCAA generates approximately one billion dollars in revenues each year. Its revenues have increased consistently over the years.”). The
district court also briefly noted most of NCAA’s revenues come from March Madness, a Division I men’s basketball tournament held annually. See id. (indicating
great value of March Madness for NCAA).
40. See id. at 1092, 1096 (noting district court analyzed alleged anticompetitive behavior under rule of reason analysis). On summary judgment, the court
opposed using the per se rule to analyze the challenge and held that the rule of
reason analysis must be implemented. See id. at 1092 (explaining why rule of reason is appropriate). For further discussion of the rule of reason analysis, see infra
notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
41. See id. at 1063 (indicating Plaintiffs focused on narrow set of NCAA rules,
specifically looking at NCAA regulation of student-athlete compensation, studentathlete benefit accrual).
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non-cash education-related benefits and academic awards that can
be provided on top of a grant-in-aid has not been proven to be necessary to preserving consumer demand” for collegiate sports and
thus does not outweigh the anticompetitive effects of such rules.42
The district court held that “NCAA limits on other education-related benefits that can be provided on top of a grant-in-aid are invalidated” and issued an injunction accordingly.43
Following the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs at the district
court level, the NCAA appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit in
May of 2020.44 In evaluating the lower court’s decision, the Ninth
Circuit stressed the fact that NCAA bylaws currently have an “Amateurism Rule” that prohibits student-athletes from using their athletic talents “for pay in any form in their sport”; this bylaw is an
eligibility requirement and any student-athlete in violation loses eligibility to participate in NCAA sports.45 However, the lower court
noted that student-athletes regularly receive compensation and
benefits beyond cost-of-attendance (“COA”), including payments
for “incidental expenses while they are travelling for certain events”
and payment of “travel expenses for certain family members to attend certain events.”46 And yet, the Ninth Circuit observed that receipt of these various payments and benefits does not exclude

42. See id. at 1110 (ruling in favor of Plaintiff class because rules were deemed
to restrain trade, in addition to disparity between financial benefit bestowed to
Defendants versus menial benefits received by student-athletes for exposition of
their own talent).
43. See id. at 1109–10 (discussing district court’s determination education-related benefits provided on top of grant-in-aid cannot be limited by NCAA). The
court recognized individual conferences or schools can still limit compensation or
benefits, “including the education-related benefits that the NCAA will not be permitted to cap.” See id. at 1109 (explaining ruling still allows limits below NCAA
organization level).
44. See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting NCAA appealed
injunction as well as ruling from Alston I).
45. See id. at 1244 (discussing eligibility implications of “Amateurism Rule” for
student-athletes). While the district court in Alston I did make references to the
amateurism rule referenced by the Ninth Circuit, no discussion of the eligibility
rule was as explicit as the Ninth Circuit’s mention, since the district court ultimately limited mention of the rule to parenthetical notes. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp.
3d at 1071 (discussing amateurism rule, NCAA amateurism bylaws).
46. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1072–74 (noting student-athletes may receive monies beyond COA through Student Assistance Fund (“SAF”), Academic
Enhancement Fund (“AEF”)). The Ninth Circuit did again address these additional benefits in its opinion and even offered a slightly more in-depth look at the
benefits available for student-athletes. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244-45 (summarizing many benefits already offered to student-athletes).
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student-athletes from intercollegiate competition nor impact their
amateur status.47
The Ninth Circuit accepted the lower court’s use of the rule of
reason in analyzing the anticompetitive behavior in question.48 In
doing so, the analysis that followed was focused on evaluating the
district court’s discretion and conclusions as opposed to rejecting
them and offering alternatives.49 After reviewing the district court’s
analysis, the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the decision in favor
of the Plaintiff class.50 The court held that the NCAA’s restrictions
on education-related benefits violated antitrust law—specifically the
Sherman Act—due to their anti-competitive nature, which was determined to be unjustifiable.51 However, the court made a key distinction regarding the extent of its holding: “limits on cash
compensation unrelated to education do not . . . constitute anticompetitive conduct and, thus, may not be enjoined.”52
While this is a narrow holding (a fact that is favorable to the
NCAA), commentators notice that it may serve a substantial blow to
the NCAA’s traditional amateurism model.53 In particular, the
NCAA fears that the Alston II decision “blurs the line between student-athletes and professionals” and “encourages never-ending litigation following every rule change.”54 Citing a fear that college
sports will be governed by the courts under the reasoning of Alston
47. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1245 (discussing ability to receive benefits in addition to COA without consequence of forfeiting eligibility to play in intercollegiate
athletics).
48. See id. at 1244 (concluding rule of reason was properly applied by district
court).
49. See generally id. (evaluating rule of reason analysis of district court).
50. See id. at 1265–66 (noting appeals court affirmed district court’s “liability
determination and injunction in all respects”).
51. See id. at 1265 (quoting O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802
F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e hold that the district court properly concluded that NCAA limits on education-related benefits do not ‘play by the Sherman Act’s rules.’ ”). For further discussion of the Sherman Act, see infra notes
75–78 and accompanying text.
52. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1264 (noting limiting compensation unrelated to education does not violate Sherman Act according to record of case at
hand).
53. See Kassandra Ramsey, NCAA Suffers Blow In Alston v. NCAA Scholarship Cost
of Attendance Case, L. OFF. OF KASSANDRA RAMSEY, P.L.L.C. (June 8, 2020), https://
www.kassandraramseylegal.com/blog/ncaa-suffers-blow-in-alston-v-ncaa-scholarship-cost-of-attendance-case [https://perma.cc/KNG4-FYM7] (discussing how outcome of Alston II was not entirely detrimental for NCAA given its narrow holding,
but NCAA’s amateurism model is threatened by Alston II’s decision).
54. See Donald M. Remy, NCAA Statement Regarding Supreme Court Petition for
Alston Case, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2020), http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-regarding-supreme-court-petition-alston-case [https://perma.cc/74YK-JUCS] (detailing NCAA
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II, the NCAA petitioned for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
and review the case.55 The Supreme Court granted the NCAA’s petition for writ of certiorari in December of 2020.56 Then the Supreme Court released its decision in Alston III near the end of June
2021.57
In Alston III, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
Alston II opinion, thereby rejecting the NCAA’s petition.58 The
Court unanimously sided with the Plaintiff class, cementing the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation as the proper analysis of antitrust law
with regards to the NCAA.59 The opinion also upheld the district
court’s injunction, affirming the district court’s determination that
education-related benefits provided on top of grant-in-aid cannot
be limited by the NCAA.60 Equally important, the Supreme Court
confirmed that the NCAA and its rules are not exempt from antitrust review under the Sherman Act.61
III. A GAME

OF

ANALYTICS: TAKING A LOOK AT ANTITRUST LAW
BACKGROUND

United States antitrust law began in 1890 with Congress’s passage of the Sherman Act.62 Subsequently, Congress amended the
fears about fallout of Alston II, plus concern about Alston II’s implications for amateurism in college sports).
55. See id. (noting NCAA asked Supreme Court to review Alston II).
56. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020),
cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020) (No. 20-512) [hereinafter Alston Petition] (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. The case is consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral
argument.”).
57. See generally Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2141 (2021) (evaluating Ninth Circuit’s Alston II decision).
58. See id. at 2166 (affirming Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston II).
59. See generally id. (noting Justice Gorsuch delivered unanimous opinion of
Supreme Court).
60. See id. at 2164-66 (recognizing district court “honored . . . principles” of
avoiding role as central planner for businesses or micromanagement of businesses
while recognizing “the district court acted within the law’s bounds.”).
61. See id. at 2156-58 (“Nor does the NCAA’s status as a particular type of
venture categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary rule of reason review.”).
The court further emphasized that “Board of Regents may suggest that courts should
take care when assessing the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation,
sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these remarks do not suggest
that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions.” See id. at 2158 (declining to adopt procompetitive presumption for
NCAA rules).
62. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/
UL26-5Z6V] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (discussing conception of antitrust laws in
United States).
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Sherman Act with the Clayton Antitrust Act (“Clayton Act”)—limiting, for example, creation of monopolies by mergers—and the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) to create the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”).63 In a general sense, antitrust laws monitor
business practices to promote competition and prohibit restraints
on trade.64 Since the implementation and introduction of these
antitrust laws, the primary objective of preserving and protecting
competition has remained the same.65
Part of the nature of antitrust law is that courts ultimately have
to decide which business practices are illegal under antitrust law
based on individual facts of every case.66 The courts have also
played an important role in clarifying the process of antitrust litigation and the extent of current laws.67 For example, the Supreme
Court has long held that Congress’s intent with the Sherman Act
was to prevent only unreasonable restraints of trade, meaning that
not all restraints of trade are prohibited.68
Courts have left a mark on antitrust law in sports as well; in
particular college athletics and the NCAA have become an important topic of antitrust litigation.69 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma (Board of Regents)70 is a
leading example of the Supreme Court’s impact on the NCAA
through antitrust litigation and is an important case that courts
consider in their assessments of antitrust allegations.71 More re63. See id. (noting Congress passed other antitrust laws in 1914 while discussing some details of Clayton Act).
64. See id. (discussing purpose of antitrust law to promote fair competition).
65. See id. (“[A]ntitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect the
process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong
incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality
up.”).
66. See id. (“The antitrust laws proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide which ones are illegal based on the
facts of each case. Courts have applied the antitrust laws to changing markets, from
a time of horse and buggies to the present digital age.”).
67. See id. (noting clarifications made by Supreme Court regarding antitrust
law). For further discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence of antitrust law, see
infra notes 68, 87–102 and accompanying text.
68. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (quoting Ariz. v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–343 (1931)) (“Although the Sherman Act, by its
terms, prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade,’ this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”).
69. For further discussion of antitrust litigation involving college athletics, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
70. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
71. See id. at 120 (holding NCAA rules restricting output were inconsistent
with Sherman Act but noting NCAA must be offered “ample latitude” to maintain
amateurism in college sports).
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cently, the NCAA has been the subject of antitrust lawsuits claiming
that NCAA rules—for example rules limiting student-athlete compensation or scholarships—have anticompetitive effects that are
against the Sherman Act.72 In addition to the antitrust litigation,
some new state laws have been proposed and enacted to allow NIL
compensation for student-athletes.73 These laws are relevant in
projecting the aggregate effect that these antitrust suits and NIL
laws will have on college sports.74
A. Checking the Rulebook: A Review of Federal Law
1. The Original Rules: The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act was the first antitrust law to be passed by
Congress in July of 1890 and was codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38.75
This Act declares illegal conspiracies, trusts, or other actions that
result in a “restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations.”76 Notably, violations of the Sherman Act may be penalized civilly or criminally.77 While Section
One of the Sherman Act is the main focus of antitrust case law discussed in this Note, Section 2 of the Sherman Act expressly prohibits both monopolization and attempts to monopolize trade or
commerce; doing so is a felony.78 While the Sherman Act is expansive and written with a broad reach, in practice it has been limited
to restrict only unreasonable restraints on trade.79
72. For further discussion of other NCAA antitrust lawsuits, see supra note 4;
see also infra notes 103–161 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (a)(1) (West 2021) (stating law’s purpose to prohibit institutions of higher education from disallowing NIL compensation of college athletes); see also, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:3B-86 - 18A:3B-89 (West
2020) (stating universities, colleges may not limit student-athletes from earning
NIL compensation).
74. For further discussion of the impact of NIL laws and the outcome of Alston II, see infra notes 317–323 and accompanying text.
75. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2021) (noting Sherman Act was first passed July
2, 1890); see also The Antitrust Laws, supra note 62 (acknowledging Sherman Act was
first antitrust law passed by Congress).
76. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2021) (discussing illegality of anticompetitive
behavior restraining competition or trade).
77. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 62 (discussing penalties for violating
Sherman Act, which may be severe—noting criminal penalties may be as much as
$100 million for corporations or sometimes “twice the amount the conspirators
gained from the illegal acts”).
78. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2021) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
79. For further discussion of the Sherman Act restricting only unreasonable
restraints on trade, see infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
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2. The Rules Get Some Changes: The Clayton Act
The Clayton Act, which is an amendment to the Sherman Act,
is codified as Sections Twelve through Twenty-Seven of the Sherman Act and was passed by Congress in 1914 to strengthen antitrust
laws and prohibit unethical corporate behavior more explicitly.80
For example, the Clayton Act prohibits anticompetitive mergers
and defines both price fixing and monopolies.81 The Clayton Act
itself was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, the CellerKefauver Act of 1950, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.82 The Clayton Act also gives a private right of
action to persons injured in business or property by violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.83
3.

Additional Oversight: The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)

The FTCA was passed alongside the Clayton Act in 1914 to create the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and oversee trade and
commerce practices.84 When the Sherman Act is violated, the
FTCA is also violated according to the Supreme Court.85 Nevertheless, the FTC does not work to enforce the Sherman Act but rather
80. See Troy Segal, Clayton Antitrust Act, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 22, 2020), https:/
/www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-antitrust-act.asp [https://perma.cc/
9HXX-LUUJ] (discussing purpose of Clayton Act); see also Clayton Act, FED. TRADE
C OMM ’ N , https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/clayton-act [https://
perma.cc/WV9Y-9GY8] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021) (noting Clayton Act is codified
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
81. See Segal, supra note 80 (noting Clayton Act “prohibits anticompetitive
mergers [and] predatory and discriminatory pricing” in attempt to regulate antitrust law).
82. See id. (noting amendments to Clayton Act since passage). The RobinsonPatman Act strengthened laws against price discrimination while the CellerKefauver Act halted company acquisition of another firm’s stock or assets when the
acquisition reduces competition. See id. (explaining antitrust amendments’ purposes). Finally, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act created a declaration requirement, thereby requiring “that companies planning big mergers or
acquisitions make their intentions known to the government before taking any
such action.” See id. (summarizing more recent antitrust amendment).
83. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 2021) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States.”).
84. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 62 (noting FTC Act was passed in 1914);
see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2021) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 43
(1914)), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority
[https://perma.cc/BP8H-5JQF] (discussing FTC’s authority to “prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties in any part of the United States” to fulfill duty to prohibit unfair competition).
85. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 62 (“The Supreme Court has said that all
violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act.”).
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“bring[s] cases under the FTC[A] against the same kinds of activities that violate the Sherman Act.”86
B. Referees Interpret the Rules: Listing Antitrust Case Law
When considering antitrust issues, the Supreme Court places a
focus on Section One of the Sherman Act, often beginning its discussion of antitrust law there.87 The Court has stated that although
the Sherman Act could be interpreted to proscribe all restraints of
trade, the proper interpretation is that it “outlaws only unreasonable restraints.”88 Interpreting this line of the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints has thus become standard for all
antitrust cases.89
There are two standards for testing whether specific restraints
of trade violate Section One of the Sherman Act: the rule of reason
and the per se rule.90 The rule of reason is considered the common
standard for testing antitrust violations and it requires “the
factfinder [to] weigh[ ] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited.”91 Part of
the rule of reason analysis is taking different factors into account
such as: information about the business; “the restraint [of trade]’s
86. See id. (noting FTC enforces Sherman Act through enforcing FTCA). The
FTC actively conducts investigations into unfair practices in the marketplace to
protect consumers and promote competition. See What We Do, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/AA7QUGMC] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021) (discussing mission, goals of FTC). In addition, the FTC will actively initiate suits against violating companies and challenge
anticompetitive mergers that may threaten consumers. See id. (“The FTC will challenge anticompetitive mergers and business practices that could harm consumers
by resulting in higher prices, lower quality, fewer choices, or reduced rates of innovation. We monitor business practices, review potential mergers, and challenge
them when appropriate to ensure that the market works according to consumer
preferences, not illegal practices.”).
87. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885
(2007) (beginning discussion of antitrust law with Section 1 of Sherman Act); see
also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (beginning discussion of antitrust
law with Section 1 of Sherman Act); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997)
(beginning Court’s opinion with discussion of Section 1 of Sherman Act).
88. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885 (quoting State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10) (“[T]he
Court has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’ ”); see also Texaco Inc., 547 U.S. at 5 (“This Court has not taken a literal
approach to this language . . . .”).
89. See, e.g., Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited); Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting Section One of Sherman Act precludes only
unreasonable restraints on trade).
90. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86 (discussing different standards for analyzing
potential antitrust violations).
91. See id. at 885 (approving rule of reason as “accepted standard” for testing
antitrust violations while discussing basic requirement of rule of reason).
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history, nature, and effect”; and “[w]hether the businesses involved
have market power.”92 Under the rule of reason analysis, antitrust
plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that the restraints in
question are “unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be
found unlawful.”93 Likewise, if a court concludes that a defendant
is practicing anticompetitive behavior through unreasonable restraints under the rule of reason, that defendant then has a “heavy
burden” of providing a defense that demonstrates a competitive justification for the anticompetitive restraint.94 Parties that fail to
meet that heavy burden and do not properly justify their anticompetitive behavior fail the rule of reason analysis and are considered
to be in violation of U.S. antitrust law.95
The per se rule is the narrowly-applied alternative to the rule of
reason.96 The Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc.97 offered a succinct discussion of the per se rule and
how it is differentiated from the rule of reason.98 The Leegin Court
explained the per se rule’s use for restraints that have the tendency
to “restrict competition and decrease output.”99 Implementation of
the per se rule should be limited only to those restraints that truly
“lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”100 The Court opined that any
adoption of the per se rule should be based on a confident conclusion by courts that an analysis of a certain restraint would never pass
92. See id. at 885–86 (discussing factors of rule of reason analysis).
93. See Texaco Inc., 547 U.S. at 5 (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of
reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular
contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will
be found unlawful.”).
94. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113 (noting anticompetitive behavior
found to be unreasonable under rule of reason may only be sustained if accused
party can demonstrate some procompetitive justification for anticompetitive
behavior).
95. See id. at 117–20 (“[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based
on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”).
96. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (articulating limited situations in which per se
rule is applied instead of rule of reason).
97. See id. at 887, 907 (holding vertical price restraints should be judged
under rule of reason). Vertical price restraints involve “agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum resale prices.” See id. at 887 (explaining vertical price restraints). Horizontal restraints include situations where
competitors have agreements to fix prices or divide markets, and fall under the per
se rule. See id. at 886 (observing recognized examples of horizontal agreements).
98. See id. at 886–87 (discussing per se rule’s narrow utility).
99. See id. at 886 (quoting Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
723 (1988)) (“Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned,
‘that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output.’ ”).
100. See id. (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Prtg.
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)) (explaining what qualifies for per se analysis).
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the scrutiny of the rule of reason.101 Moreover, the per se rule
should not be adopted “where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious,” or at least reluctantly so
applied.102
C. Madness Outside of March: NCAA Antitrust Case Law
1. How Referees Are Trained: Reviewing Board of Regents
Board of Regents has long been considered “the seminal case on
the interaction between the NCAA and the Sherman Act.”103 In
Board of Regents, an NCAA television plan limiting the total number
of televised college football games was challenged as anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.104 The Court recognized the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s arrangement with member schools
that gave members no real choice with television controls.105 Ultimately, the Court applied a rule of reason analysis and ruled against
the NCAA, stating that rules restricting output and limiting member schools played a role in restricting college athletics rather than
enhancing the program.106
Despite its narrow holding, Board of Regents has had a lasting
impact on how the NCAA must be analyzed under the Sherman
Act.107 Part of this impact was the Court’s dicta on the role the
NCAA plays in preserving amateur sports.108 The Court noted that
101. See id. at 886–887 (citations omitted) (noting predictability of outcome
under rule of reason is benchmark for when per se rule may be applied).
102. See id. at 887 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)) (“It
should come as no surprise, then, that ‘we have expressed reluctance to adopt per
se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships
where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.’ ”).
103. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir.
2012) (noting importance of Board of Regents for antitrust case law involving
NCAA).
104. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 90–95 (1984) (explaining NCAA television plan in controversy, including issues arising from NCAA members who were
also members of College Football Association that negotiated television broadcast
contracts separate from deal existing with NCAA to increase revenues).
105. See id. at 104–107 (noting NCAA’s television plan restricts competition by
restraining price, restraining output, taking freedom to compete from individual
competitors).
106. See id. at 120 (“Today we hold only that the record supports the District
Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member
institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”).
107. For further discussion of the Board of Regents holding, see supra note 106
and accompanying text.
108. See Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to
O’Bannon: How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football, 26 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 331, 346 (2016) (noting Supreme Court’s “ample latitude” com-
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the “[NCAA] needs ample latitude to play that role” and “that the
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”109 This explanation of the
NCAA’s important role in maintaining the amateurism of college
sports and the declaration from the Court about the NCAA’s overall consistency with the Sherman Act create a difficult task for
courts in analyzing potential antitrust violations of the NCAA.110
Effectively, the Supreme Court told courts to defer to NCAA rules
as much as possible.111 Yet Board of Regents simultaneously identified an instance where deference to the NCAA no longer applied.112 Ultimately, courts attempting to reconcile the holding
(though limited) and dicta of Board of Regents have created a difference of opinion in circuit courts.113
2.

Splitting Free Throws and Ending Up With a Circuit Split

It has been over thirty years since the last time the Supreme
Court heard a case on amateurism in college sports.114 Since,
scholars have been anticipating review of another case given growing social concerns for student-athlete compensation.115 The words
of Justice Stevens in Board of Regents continue to echo through
courts faced with antitrust claims involving the NCAA.116 Largely
due to Stevens’ “ample latitude” dicta, the failure of antitrust claims
ment in Board of Regents was dicta directed at “[s]tudent-athlete regulation . . . not
even before the Court”).
109. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (explaining importance of NCAA in
regulating student-athletes).
110. See Baker III & Brison, supra note 108, at 346 (discussing some subsequent district courts’, appellate courts’ reliance on Board of Regents’ dicta to shield
NCAA from all antitrust law review).
111. See id. at 351 (explaining Board of Regents’ deference to NCAA with “ample latitude” statement).
112. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (holding NCAA’s curtailing of output
with television plan was violation of Sherman Act).
113. For further discussion of the circuit split on NCAA antitrust issues, see
infra notes 114–161 and accompanying text.
114. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (noting Board of Regents was decided
in 1984).
115. See Audrey C. Sheetz, Note, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865,
882 (2016) (noting gap in time since NCAA amateurism was last considered by
Supreme Court while discussing reasons for Court to hear another amateurism
case).
116. See Grimmett, supra note 12, at 842 (noting impact of Board of Regents
dicta on subsequent NCAA antitrust suits).
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against the NCAA since Board of Regents has been common.117 Nevertheless, a circuit split arose regarding the weight of deference for
antitrust claims against the NCAA, where a claim lived or died depending on the circuit in which it was heard.118 Some circuits had
effectively granted antitrust exemptions to some NCAA rules because of how they identified commercial markets.119 Meanwhile,
other circuits also interpreted Board of Regents language as giving
the NCAA another strong exemption from antitrust claims based
on their great deference to NCAA rules.120
a. Blowing the Whistle: The Seventh, Sixth, and Third Circuits
Give The NCAA Some Wiggle Room—But Differ On
How Much
The Seventh, Sixth, and Third Circuits each decided antitrust
cases that favor the NCAA and even prevented some antitrust litigation against the NCAA in their circuits altogether.121 The Seventh
Circuit’s decision created a procompetitive presumption for some
NCAA regulations, effectively assuring that they withstand anticompetitive challenges.122 Meanwhile, the Sixth and Third Circuits determined that the NCAA rules challenged in their cases were not
commercial in nature, thus they could not be analyzed under antitrust law.123
117. See id. (noting lack of success of many antitrust claims against NCAA
since Board of Regents).
118. For further discussion of circuit courts that have ruled in favor of the
NCAA, see infra notes 124–148 and accompanying text. For further discussion of
circuit court ruling against the NCAA, see infra notes 149–161 and accompanying
text.
119. See, e.g., Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“In order to state a claim under the Sherman Act there must be a
commercial activity implicated . . . . NCAA’s rules on recruiting student athletes . . .
are all explicitly non-commercial. In fact, those rules are anti-commercial and designed to promote and ensure competitiveness amongst NCAA member schools.”).
120. See, e.g., Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43
(7th Cir. 2012) (stating Board of Regents created “procompetitive presumption for
certain NCAA regulations” that “help maintain the revered tradition of amateurism in college sports or the preservation of the student-athlete in higher
education”).
121. For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s Agnew, see infra notes
124–131 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s Bassett, see infra notes 132–138 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the
Third Circuit’s Smith, see infra notes 139–148 and accompanying text.
122. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 342–43 (discussing procompetitive presumption
given to certain NCAA regulations).
123. See Bassett, 528 F.3d at 429–30 (noting challenged NCAA rules were not
commercial in nature); see also Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d
180, 185–86 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating NCAA eligibility rules are non-commercial).
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i. Official Timeout: Recapping the Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning in
Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association124
In Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,125 student-athlete plaintiffs alleged that NCAA regulations violated the Sherman
Act by both capping the number of scholarships given per team and
prohibiting multi-year scholarships.126 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.127 This
court made its affirmation reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to
identify a cognizable commercial market impacted by the NCAA
rules at issue.128 Nevertheless, the Agnew court stated that the student-athlete scholarship market can be considered a labor market
given that colleges engage in competition to attract student-athletes
to their campuses by offering benefits instead of cash.129 While Agnew ultimately left questions as to how to identify a labor market in
antitrust cases, it also interpreted Board of Regents to provide a heavy
procompetitive presumption to NCAA regulations so long as they
are “of the type that have been blessed by the Supreme Court.”130
Though not a declaration of unconditional support for NCAA rules
and regulations, the Agnew court’s interpretation of the term “ample latitude” from Board of Regents created a daunting standard of
124. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2008).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 332 (noting plaintiffs’ claim against NCAA). The plaintiffs in
Agnew had both suffered injuries that ended their football careers. See id. (explaining facts of case). Because they could no longer play football, their one-year athletic scholarships “were not renewed.” See id. (acknowledging source of plaintiffs’
claim).
127. See id. at 347 (rejecting lower court’s reasoning but affirming district
court’s dismissal of claims).
128. See id. at 345 (stating dismissal by district court was justified because
plaintiffs did not identify commercial market in their complaint). The Seventh
Circuit differed from the lower court, however, in that it recognized the plaintiffs
“could” have identified an appropriate market but “did not” do so in their complaint. See id. (acknowledging plaintiffs’ ability to identify market).
129. See id. at 346–47 (“We find this argument [of no identifiable labor market for student-athletes] unconvincing for two reasons. First, the only reason that
colleges do not engage in price competition for student-athletes is that other
NCAA bylaws prevent them from doing so. The fact that certain procompetitive,
legitimate trade restrictions exist in a given industry does not remove that industry
from the purview of the Sherman Act altogether . . . . Second, colleges do, in fact,
compete for student-athletes, though the price they pay involves in-kind benefits as
opposed to cash.”).
130. See id. at 341–43 (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)) (extending “ample latitude” to automatically grant procompetitive presumption for
NCAA regulations that are “ ‘clearly meant to help maintain the revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports’ or the ‘preservation of the student-athlete in
higher education’ ”).
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deference for some NCAA rules that would be difficult for future
plaintiffs to overcome.131
ii.

Calling to the Replay Center: The Sixth Circuit Clamps Down on
Defining Commercial Activity

In Basset v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,132 the plaintiff
alleged a violation of the Sherman Act against the NCAA for conspiring with member conferences to prevent the plaintiff from
holding a coaching position at another NCAA member school.133
The Sixth Circuit held that the claim was not commercial in nature
so the antitrust claim was properly dismissed.134 More specifically,
the actions of the NCAA in question were deemed not commercial
in nature so the claim could not go forward.135 Possibly the most
important statement on commercial nature from Bassett was its
commentary on eligibility rules and rules regarding recruitment of
student-athletes.136 The Sixth Circuit went as far as to say that eligibility rules and rules on recruiting student-athletes are not just “explicitly non-commercial” but are even “anti-commercial.” 137
Adoption of this interpretation would shield any NCAA rules regarding eligibility or student-athlete recruitment from antitrust
131. See id. (noting NCAA regulations may be presumed procompetitive
under Board of Regents). Despite its great deference to the Supreme Court’s dicta
from Board of Regents, the Agnew court went on to determine that the bylaws in
question did not meet the procompetitive presumption afforded by Board of Regents. See id. at 344–45 (acknowledging procompetitive presumption does not apply to bylaws at issue). However, the Seventh Circuit did not make a determination
on whether the bylaws were themselves anticompetitive because that issue was not
reached by the district court. See id. at 345 (declining to rule on anticompetitiveness of bylaws).
132. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008).
133. See id. at 429–30 (describing claim filed against NCAA).
134. See id. at 429 (“The Appellant’s appeal is not well taken. We find the
district court correctly determined Appellant’s antitrust claim was not commercial
in nature and failed to allege an antitrust injury.”).
135. See id. at 432–33 (noting focus of whether action is commercial is “on the
enforcement action itself and not NCAA as a commercial entity” while concluding
plaintiff’s complaint was “wholly devoid of any allegation on the commercial nature of NCAA’s enforcement of the rules” that plaintiff violated).
136. For further discussion of Bassett’s commentary on commercial nature,
see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
137. See Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433 (stating NCAA rules regarding eligibility or
student-athlete recruitment are “anti-commercial” in nature). The Bassett court reasoned that like eligibility rules, rules controlling recruitment that govern fraud and
inducement are tailored to discourage commercial advantage among schools. See
id. (explaining purpose of NCAA eligibility rules).
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claims because an antitrust claim cannot commence without the alleged violation being commercial in nature.138
iii.

Sticking with the Original Call: The Third Circuit’s Smith v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association139 Precedes and
Persuades Bassett

In Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,140 the plaintiff
had participated in Division I athletics during her undergraduate
education but was precluded from competing in NCAA athletics
during her post-baccalaureate education due to an NCAA bylaw
prohibiting participation “in intercollegiate athletics at a postgraduate institution other than the institution from which the student
earned her undergraduate degree.”141 The Smith plaintiff alleged
that the bylaw violated the Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade.142 The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the Sherman Act claim, stating that the bylaw “clearly
survives a rule of reason analysis.”143
However, the Third Circuit did its rule of reason analysis after
already ruling in favor of the NCAA so that analysis is more of a
courtesy made by the court than it is the principal rule of the
case.144 Thus, Smith’s determination regarding the commercial nature of eligibility rules is the main takeaway of the case.145 Smith
states that “the [NCAA’s] eligibility rules are not related to the
NCAA’s commercial or business activities” as they do not seek to
give the NCAA any commercial advantage—rather, they try to ensure fair collegiate athletic competition.146 Because “restraints in
business and commercial transactions” are the focus of the Sherman Act, this ruling by the Third Circuit effectively eliminated
138. See id. at 432 (“[I]n order for the Sherman Act to apply, the enforcement
action ‘must be commercial in nature.’ ”).
139. See Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
140. See id. at 186 (finding Sherman Act does not apply to NCAA eligibility
requirements).
141. See id. at 183 (giving background on facts of case, bylaw at issue).
142. See id. at 184 (stating plaintiff’s claim).
143. See id. at 187-190 (stating bylaw passes rule of reason while affirming district court on Sherman Act issue).
144. See id. at 185-87 (holding “Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s
promulgation of eligibility requirements” but noting even if Sherman Act applied,
NCAA’s eligibility requirements would pass rule of reason analysis).
145. For further discussion of Smith’s commercial analysis, see infra notes
146–148 and accompanying text.
146. See Smith, 139 F.3d at 185–86 (holding eligibility rules are non-commercial, so not under Sherman Act).
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claims focusing on NCAA eligibility rules.147 This reasoning was
later adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Bassett.148
b. Making A Big Three-Pointer: The Ninth Circuit Pushes Back
on the NCAA in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association149
The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon provided an analysis less
favorable to the NCAA.150 In O’Bannon, a former college basketball
player saw his likeness used in a videogame but was not compensated and he did not consent to the use of his likeness.151 A claim
was then filed against the NCAA, alleging that its amateurism rules
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving NIL compensation were
in violation of the Sherman Act.152
In its opinion, the O’Bannon court created a circuit split with
the Seventh Circuit and with the Sixth and Third Circuits.153 Regarding interpretation of the Board of Regents language, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s dicta was “informative” but ultimately the circuit court refused to offer a presumption
of validity to NCAA rules.154 Instead, O’Bannon interpreted Board of
Regents as merely holding that “no NCAA rule should be invalidated
without a Rule of Reason analysis”; the Ninth Circuit did not agree
147. See id. (“Based upon the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Sherman
Act primarily was intended to prevent unreasonable restraints in business and commercial transactions . . . and therefore has only limited applicability to organizations which have principally noncommercial objectives . . . we find that the
Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility
requirements.”).
148. For further discussion of Bassett and its commercial nature analysis, see
supra notes 133–138 and accompanying text.
149. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015).
150. For further discussion of the O’Bannon opinion, see infra notes 151–161
and accompanying text.
151. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055 (explaining origin of suit while referencing videogame portraying NCAA athlete without his consent).
152. See id. (noting plaintiff sued, claiming NCAA amateurism rules preventing student-athlete NIL compensation were illegal restraint of trade under Sherman Act).
153. For further discussion of O’Bannon opposing other circuits, see infra
notes 154–161 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s Agnew, see supra notes 124–131 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s Bassett, see supra notes 132–138 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s Smith, see supra notes 139–148 and
accompanying text.
154. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064 (“In sum, we accept Board of Regents’ guidance as informative with respect to the procompetitive purposes served by the
NCAA’s amateurism rules, but we will go no further than that. The amateurism
rules’ validity must be proved, not presumed.”).
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with the sentiment that Board of Regents established NCAA amateurism rules “as categorically consistent with the Sherman Act.”155 The
Ninth Circuit thus contrasted the strong presumption of validity
given to NCAA rules by the Seventh Circuit in Agnew.156
O’Bannon also addressed the commercial activity requirement
of the Sherman Act by again combating the NCAA’s claim that their
rules were not subject to the Sherman Act.157 In analyzing this argument, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the analysis of the
Sixth Circuit or Third Circuit in Bassett and Smith, respectively.158
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that even where NCAA rules are “‘anticommercial and designed to promote and ensure competitiveness,’
[those rules] surely affect commerce just as much as rules promoting commercialism.”159 Because the NCAA compensation rules
regulate an exchange—“labor for in-kind compensation—[that] is
a quintessentially commercial transaction,” the rules themselves can
be considered commercial in nature despite their “anti-commercial” intent.160 In coming to this conclusion on commercialism, the
Ninth Circuit called Bassett’s reasoning “simply wrong” while distinguishing from Smith based on the fact that the post-baccalaureate
bylaw at issue in Smith was “not related to the NCAA’s commercial
or business activities,” unlike compensation rules.161
155. See id. at 1063 (stating NCAA amateurism rules do not automatically
dodge label of anticompetitive, so requirement exists to analyze NCAA rules under
rule of reason).
156. See id. at 1064 (“Only . . . the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Agnew v.
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) . . . comes close to agreeing with the NCAA’s
interpretation of Board of Regents, and we find it unpersuasive . . . . Like the amateurism language in Board of Regents, Agnew’s ‘procompetitive presumption’ was
dicta that was ultimately unnecessary to the court’s resolution of that case. But we
would not adopt the Agnew presumption even if it were not dicta. Agnew’s analysis
rested on the dubious proposition that in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
‘blessed’ NCAA rules that were not before it, and did so to a sufficient degree to
virtually exempt those rules from antitrust scrutiny . . . . We doubt that was the
Court’s intent, and we will not give such an aggressive construction to its words.”).
For further discussion of Agnew’s “procompetitive presumption,” see supra notes
130–131 and accompanying text.
157. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064–65 (noting NCAA’s argument that its
compensation rules do not fall under Sherman Act because they are not commercial in nature but stating NCAA’s argument about commercial nature “is not
credible”).
158. See id. at 1066 (“Neither Smith nor Bassett convinces us that the NCAA’s
compensation rules are noncommercial.”).
159. See id. (citation omitted) (explaining how even “anti-commercial” rules can
affect commercialism).
160. See id. (stating NCAA’s compensation rules may be analyzed under Sherman Act).
161. See id. (noting disagreement with Bassett while also distinguishing Smith).
While O’Bannon did distinguish Smith based on the differences of rules at issue,
Smith’s reasoning still did not persuade the O’Bannon court to label the NCAA’s
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D. Possible Rules Changes: State Pay for Play Laws Emerge
This Note does not focus on NIL or pay for play laws being
enacted to aid in student-athlete compensation, as they are merely
an example of government intervention that relates to NCAA rules;
the government intervention itself is not antitrust-related.162 Nevertheless, rules capping student-athlete compensation are at issue in
Alston II so a brief discussion of emerging pay for play laws is warranted.163 California’s Governor, Gavin Newsom, signed the Fair
Pay to Play Act in September of 2019 to allow NIL compensation for
college student-athletes.164 The law will eventually take effect in
2023 and has put immense pressure on the NCAA to adjust its policy given the large draw of California universities’ sports programs.165 Outside of the pressure placed on the NCAA, other states
are feeling the pressure of California’s new law and several states
are proposing their own legislation.166 States including New Jersey,
Colorado, and Florida have Pay to Play legislation set to go into
effect, thereby creating opportunities for student-athletes to be
paid without losing scholarship eligibility.167
compensation rules as noncommercial. See id. (explaining intent behind NCAA
rules does not negate effect on commerce).
162. For further discussion of pay for play laws, see infra notes 163–166 and
accompanying text.
163. See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting NCAA limits
on student-athlete compensation).
164. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (a)(1) (West 2021) (discussing bill’s purpose in prohibiting institutions of higher education from disallowing NIL compensation of college athletes, including intent of legislature to adopt policies avoiding
exploitation of student-athletes); see also Blinder, supra note 8 (noting California
bill allows players to “strike endorsement deals and hire agents”). For further discussion of California Governor Newsom’s comments about the no pay policy, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
165. See Blinder, supra note 8 (noting law should take effect in 2023 while
discussing Governor Newsom’s threat to NCAA regarding NCAA losing membership of California schools).
166. See Norlander, supra note 5 (noting California’s passage of Pay to Play
Act has created “ripple effect” leading to greater push against NCAA amateurism,
supported with list of various pay to play bills set to be introduced in various
states); see also Ross Dellenger, With Recruiting in Mind, States Jockey to One-Up Each
Other in Chaotic Race for NIL Laws, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2021), https://
www.si.com/college/2021/03/04/name-image-likeness-state-laws-congress-ncaa
[https://perma.cc/L2Z3-N4VW] (“Dozens of state legislatures are close to adopting laws governing athlete compensation within their borders.”).
167. See Gregg E. Clifton, New Jersey Grants Name, Image, Likeness Rights to Collegiate Student-Athletes, N A T ’ L L. R E V . (Sep. 15, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-grants-name-image-likeness-rights-to-collegiate-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/7BZ4-724E] (noting these laws have
been passed only on limited scale thus far).
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NARRATIVE

A. The Starters Come Out Strong: The Majority Affirms the
District Court
After reciting the facts of the case and conclusions of the district court, the Alston II court then analyzed the conclusions of the
district court, beginning by evaluating whether stare decisis or res
judicata applied.168 Following that analysis, the court examined the
antitrust findings of the district court and then the injunction issued by the district court.169 The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s injunction and agreed with the finding that “NCAA
limits on education-related benefits ‘do not play by the Sherman
Act’s rules.’”170
1.

Should The Game Be Happening?: The Ninth Circuit Handles Stare
Decisis and Res Judicata Arguments

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether
the Alston II litigation was foreclosed by stare decisis or precluded
by res judicata.171 Stare decisis is a Latin phrase that means “to
stand by things decided” and this doctrine binds courts to precedent for issues already decided.172 Res judicata is a Latin phrase
meaning “a matter judged” and refers to the legal principle that a
claim cannot be relitigated after having been judged on the
merits.173
In determining whether stare decisis would stop the Alston II
litigation, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the factual differences between the current case and O’Bannon were “material to the
application of the rule or allow the precedent to be distinguished
168. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1252–53 (discussing concepts of stare decisis, res
judicata before considering whether stare decisis or res judicata applied to case at
hand).
169. See id. at 1256–65 (analyzing district court’s findings, conclusions of law).
170. See id. at 1265–66 (“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district
court properly concluded that NCAA limits on education-related benefits do not
‘play by the Sherman Act’s rules.’ Accordingly, we affirm its liability determination
and injunction in all respects.”).
171. See id. at 1252–53 (questioning whether res judicata or stare decisis apply
given Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n).
172. See Stare Decisis, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
stare_decisis [https://perma.cc/27FZ-ETDA] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021) (explaining stare decisis doctrine).
173. See Res judicata, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
res_judicata [https://perma.cc/6LRS-Q3J2] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021) (explaining res judicata doctrine).
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on a principled basis.”174 The court considered the NCAA’s argument to foreclose the litigation and rejected the NCAA’s argument,
reasoning that a rule of reason analysis relies on “case-by-case adjudication” and is “fact-dependent.”175 The court noted that the previous O’Bannon litigation cited by the NCAA was factually different,
as O’Bannon narrowly addressed NCAA restrictions on NIL compensation while Alston II broadly considered “NCAA rules that limit the
compensation [student-athletes] may receive in exchange for athletic services.”176
The Alston II court rejected the argument that the NCAA
avoided antitrust liability by relaxing its compensation limits in the
wake of O’Bannon; even though the limits were relaxed, the existence of limits on student-athlete compensation was still anticompetitive.177 The Ninth Circuit accepted Plaintiffs’ argument that the
NCAA’s own statement on relaxed compensation limits since
O’Bannon demonstrated factual differences between O’Bannon and
Alston II given the difference in rules.178 Specifically, this change in
rules by the NCAA usurped “the factual assumption that drove the
result in O’Bannon” because although offering student-athletes
compensation unrelated to education was in great contrast to
NCAA rules of the time, the NCAA rules during the Alston II litigation are no longer a “quantum leap” from what the NCAA allows.179
174. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1253 (noting basic standard for foreclosing litigation based on stare decisis).
175. See id. at 1253–54 (noting antitrust litigation has great reliance on facts
of case; stating NCAA’s argument to foreclose litigation “ignores the inherently
fact-dependent nature of a Rule of Reason analysis”).
176. See id. at 1254 (“The district court meaningfully and properly distinguished O’Bannon II from the current litigation as a narrow challenge to restrictions on NIL compensation . . . . By contrast, this action more broadly targets the
‘interconnected set of NCAA rules that limit the compensation [student-athletes]
may receive in exchange for their athletic services.’ ”).
177. See id. (“The district court rightly concluded that this argument misses
the mark: ‘It is the fact that the prices of student-athlete compensation are fixed, as
opposed to the amount at which these prices are fixed, that renders the agreements at issue anticompetitive.’ ” (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1095
(N.D. Cal. 2019))).
178. See id. (“[T]he NCAA’s concession that it has relaxed its compensation
limits since O’Bannon only underscores that the instant litigation is materially factually different from O’Bannon.”).
179. See id. at 1254–55 (noting while offering non-education-related compensation to student-athletes was greatly different from NCAA rules in O’Bannon, difference between such compensation versus NCAA rules during Alston II was much
smaller). Thus, the NCAA rules during O’Bannon seem so far away from ever leading to non-education-related cash payments for student-athletes. See id. at 1255
(“[T]he changes to compensation limits since O’Bannon “alter the factual assumption that drove the result in O’Bannon: they show that non-education-related cash
payments in excess of the [COA] are no longer a ‘quantum leap’ from current
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The court then demonstrated more factual differences between Alston II and O’Bannon by listing certain types of student-athlete compensation that began after O’Bannon.180 Because of these factual
differences, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
instant litigation was not foreclosed by stare decisis.181
The Ninth Circuit did a quick analysis of the NCAA’s res judicata claim and ultimately rejected it.182 First, the court reasoned
that the NCAA did not bear its burden for proving the required
elements to preclude a claim under res judicata.183 Next, the court
stated that “[c]laim preclusion does not apply to claims that were
not in existence and could not have been sued upon . . . when the
allegedly preclusive action was initiated”; because the current claim
arose following O’Bannon, it could not be barred.184
2.

Back to The Rulebook: Reviewing the District Court’s Sherman Act
Conclusions and Judgment

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision to
apply the rule of reason in its antitrust analysis.185 As commentators have noted, this application of the rule of reason relied on an
interpretation of Board of Regents that did not grant special antitrust
protections to the NCAA—a conclusion that O’Bannon originally
posited.186 A three-step framework for the rule of reason analysis
was laid out:
NCAA practice.”). However, now in Alston II, that relaxation of rules makes allowing non-education-related compensation for student-athletes seem possible. See
id. (explaining how rule changes allow for current litigation). This makes the Alston II litigation materially factually different from O’Bannon. See id. at 1254–55
(confirming rule changes since O’Bannon create factual differences from
O’Bannon).
180. See id. at 1255 (footnote omitted) (“For example, the court found that,
after the O’Bannon record closed, student-athletes have received, inter alia, athletic participation awards in the form of Visa gift cards, SAF disbursements in the
thousands of dollars to pay for loss-of-value insurance, and personal expenses unrelated to education.”).
181. See id. (acknowledging some student-athlete compensation practices arising after O’Bannon but declining to adopt NCAA’s interpretation of O’Bannon as
foreclosing Alston II litigation).
182. See id. at 1255–56 (recounting Ninth Circuit res judicata discussion while
stating instant case was not barred under res judicata).
183. See id. at 1255 (declaring NCAA did not carry its burden for applying res
judicata).
184. See id. at 1255–56 (stating student-athletes’ antitrust claim was not barred
because it had “[arisen] from events that occurred after the O’Bannon record
closed”).
185. See id. at 1256 (noting proper rule for antitrust analysis is rule of reason).
186. See Baker III & Brison, supra note 108, at 352 (“By subjecting the NCAA’s
amateurism regulations to the rule of reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit deviated
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(1) Student-Athletes “bear[ ] the initial burden of showing
that the restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market”; (2) if they carry that burden, the NCAA “must come forward with evidence of the
restraint’s procompetitive effects”; and (3) Student-Athletes “must then show that any legitimate objectives can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”187
In clarifying the standard for striking down NCAA rules, the
Ninth Circuit stated that courts cannot “strike down largely beneficial market restraints” and should only act when a restraint goes far
beyond what is necessary to achieve procompetitive effects.188 In
stating this, the Ninth Circuit again reiterated its O’Bannon analysis
of replacing only restraints that are “patently and inexplicably stricter
than necessary.”189
a. Out of Bounds, Plaintiffs’ Ball: Analyzing Plaintiffs’ Burden to
Show Anticompetitive Effects of Restraint
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Plaintiffs carried their
initial burden under step one of the rule of reason analysis by showing that the NCAA rule at issue had anticompetitive effects.190 As
part of that determination, the court stated that the NCAA’s disputed rules “have significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant
from the line of district and circuit cases that interpreted Justice Stevens’s [Board of
Regents] dicta in ways that fortified the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions as noncommercial and, therefore, outside of § 1 [of the Sherman Act’s] jurisdiction.”).
187. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256 (stating how to analyze under rule of
reason).
188. See id. (“Throughout this analysis, we remain mindful that, although the
NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, . . . courts are not ‘free to micromanage
organizational rules or to strike down largely beneficial market restraints’ . . . .
Accordingly, a court must invalidate a restraint and replace it with a [less restrictive
alternative] only if the restraint is ‘patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary
to accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives.’ ”).
189. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“Thus, in holding that setting the grant-in-aid cap at student-athletes’
full cost of attendance is a substantially less restrictive alternative under the Rule of
Reason, we are not declaring that courts are free to micromanage organizational
rules or to strike down largely beneficial market restraints with impunity. Rather,
our affirmance of this aspect of the district court’s decision should be taken to
establish only that where, as here, a restraint is patently and inexplicably stricter than
is necessary to accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives, an antitrust court
can and should invalidate it and order it replaced with a less restrictive
alternative.”).
190. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256 (stating student-athletes passed first step of
rule of reason). For further discussion of the steps of a rule of reason analysis, see
supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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market” for Plaintiffs’ student-athlete labor.191 Closing up this
stage of analysis, the court noted that the NCAA did not even dispute the findings regarding the anticompetitive effects of the relevant NCAA rules.192 The Supreme Court later reiterated this point
in its opinion, quoting the district court’s opinion.193
b. Challenge On the Call: Analyzing NCAA’s Procompetitive
Justification for Anticompetitive Restraints
The circuit court then considered the procompetitive effects of
the disputed NCAA rule, noting the NCAA’s heavy burden to
demonstrate those procompetitive effects as well as the NCAA’s disagreement with the district court’s analysis on this step.194 The
NCAA’s procompetitive justification was that the challenged rules
preserved amateurism and the difference between college and professional sports, thereby preserving consumer demand for amateurism and college sports.195 Ultimately, the court not only accepted
the district court’s findings but also followed the district court’s
191. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256 (noting rules had anticompetitive effects
for Plaintiffs). The court also provides a quote from the district court opinion in
Alston I to provide more clarity on the reasoning for why the compensation rules
are anticompetitive:
“[B]ecause elite student-athletes lack any viable alternatives to [D1], they
are forced to accept, to the extent they want to attend college and play
sports at an elite level after high school, whatever compensation is offered to them by [D1] schools, regardless of whether any such compensation is an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic
services.”
Id. at 1256–57. For further discussion of the NCAA rules at issue in Alston II, see
supra notes 34, 41 and accompanying text.
192. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256–57 (“These findings ‘have substantial support in the record’ and the NCAA does not dispute them.” (citations omitted)).
193. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2161-62 (2021) (“As we have seen, based
on a voluminous record, the district court held that the student-athletes had shown
the NCAA enjoys the power to set wages in the market for student-athletes’ labor—
and that the NCAA has exercised that power in ways that have produced significant anticompetitive effects. Perhaps even more notably, the NCAA ‘did not meaningfully dispute’ this conclusion.” (citation omitted)).
194. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257 (“[T]he NCAA bears a ‘heavy burden’ of
‘competitively justify[ing]’ its undisputed ‘deviation from the operations of a free
market.’ ”) (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984)). For further discussion of steps of rule of reason analysis, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
195. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257 (“On appeal, the NCAA advances a single
procompetitive justification: The challenged rules preserve ‘amateurism,’ which,
in turn, ‘widen[s] consumer choice’ by maintaining a distinction between college
and professional sports.”). In a concurring opinion issued by the Supreme Court,
Justice Kavanaugh called the NCAA’s argument “circular and unpersuasive.” See
Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (indicating discontent for
NCAA’s justification for its rules).
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lead in splitting the analysis between limits restricting unlimited
cash payments versus limits restricting education-related benefits.196
The Ninth Circuit briefly acknowledged that maintaining a distinction between college and professional sports is important to
consumer demand and noted that “improving [consumer] choice
is procompetitive.”197 However, the Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s finding that rules restricting non-cash education-related benefits are not procompetitive because they have no
demand-preserving effect.198 The court accepted this finding
under the reasoning that the values of these types of benefits “[are]
inherently limited to [their] actual value[s], and could not be confused with a professional athlete’s salary.”199 The court gave a graduate school scholarship as an example of the limited value of
education-related benefits.200
The circuit court similarly accepted the district court’s reliance
on demand analyses, survey evidence, and NCAA testimony, all of
which indicated that restrictions on non-cash education-related
benefits have no procompetitive effect.201 The court went on to
196. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1260 (observing different finding for procompetitive nature of unlimited cash payment restrictions compared to finding for education-related benefits). The court ultimately held limits preventing unlimited
cash payments preserve demand while restrictions on education-related benefits
do not preserve demand. See id. (differentiating education-related benefits from
non-education-related benefits).
197. See id. at 1257 (acknowledging importance of distinction between college
versus professional sports for consumer demand, consumer preference).
198. See id. at 1257–58 (concluding restrictions on non-cash education-related
benefits do not have procompetitive justification). The Supreme Court likewise
agreed with the district court’s findings that “less restrictive restraints on education-related benefits” could still result in procompetitive effects for the NCAA. See
Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2162 (agreeing with district court analysis on educationrelated benefits).
199. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257 (explaining value limitations of non-cash
education-related benefits).
200. See id. (explaining limited nature of value of education-related benefits,
focusing on inherent difference between professional salaries, educational
benefits).
201. See id. at 1257–58 (discussing evidence from district court testimony,
analyses, surveys demonstrated lack of demand-preservation provided by disputed
non-education-related restrictions). The mentioned demand analyses noted that
relaxation of NCAA restrictions on education-related benefits since O’Bannon has
not diminished consumer demand for NCAA events and activities. See id. at 1258
(explaining rule relaxations’ impact on demand for NCAA). The Plaintiffs also
provided survey evidence that if NCAA rules allowed for some education-related
benefits, NCAA demand would not be negatively impacted. See id. (“Student-Athletes’ survey evidence reflects that individually implementing seven types of education-related benefits—limited or forbidden under the challenged rules—would
not diminish the survey respondents’ viewership or attendance.”). Finally, the
Ninth Circuit mentioned NCAA testimony that demand studies were not consulted
when making rules about compensation. See id. (“NCAA witnesses confirmed that
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reject the NCAA’s contention that NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting payment beyond the COA “[expand] consumer choice.”202 It
did so reasoning that while Board of Regents and the Ninth Circuit’s
O’Bannon “define amateurism to exclude payment for athletic performance,” the Board of Regents definition was dicta and the
O’Bannon definition accepted the NCAA’s understanding of amateurism based on the record of that case.203 Furthermore, the record in Alston II called for a narrower understanding of
“amateurism that still gives rise to procompetitive effects,” stating
that limits on unlimited payments to student-athletes are what differentiate student-athletes from professional athletes.204 When this
definition of amateurism was considered in O’Bannon, one commentator foresaw the potential for the NCAA to incorporate rules
valuing both compensation and amateurism without diminishing
one of those values.205 Partially supporting that analysis, the Ninth
Circuit in Alston II thus rejected the NCAA’s proposed amateurism
standard—which relied on not allowing any payment above COA—
based on evidence that the recent “increase in permissible forms of
above-COA compensation” did not diminish college sports demand.206 In doing so, the court determined that NCAA restrictions
the NCAA set limits on education-related benefits without consulting any demand
studies.”).
202. See id. (stating NCAA’s argument “lacks support in both precedent and
the record”).
203. See id. (presenting Board of Regents’, O’Bannon’s definitions of
amateurism).
204. See id. (discussing difference between college versus professional sports).
205. See Sheetz, supra note 115, at 880-81 (“Following O’Bannon, [t]here are
significant tensions still at play between the values of education and amateurism
and the goals of compensating college athletes. However, by upholding both values in its decisions, perhaps the court left room for the NCAA to adopt a model
that incorporates both compensation and amateurism.”).
206. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1258–59 (recounting reasoning in rejecting
NCAA’s standard for amateurism rules, including its compensation rules). The
Ninth Circuit also elaborated on why it rejected the NCAA’s amateurism definition
and survey evidence that the organization provided. See id. at 1259 (“The survey
results reflect, at most, a consumer preference for ‘amateurism,’ but do not capture
the effects (if any) that the tested compensation scenarios would have on consumer behavior.”). The court agreed with the district court’s description of the
NCAA survey—which asked fans why they watched college sports and had 31.7% of
responses select preference for the fact that college players are “amateurs and/or
are not paid”—as “hopelessly ambiguous.” See id. (recognizing amateurism term is
without fixed definition). The court concluded that respondents selecting that
answer “may have very well equated amateurism with student status, irrespective of
whether those students receive compensation for athletics.” See id. (speculating
survey answer choices were not clear). Given this ambiguity, the NCAA’s survey
results did not have the value that the NCAA purported; they certainly did not
have enough value to support the “expansive conception of amateurism.” See id.
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on certain education-related compensation had no procompetitive
justification.207
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the procompetitive effects of
NCAA restrictions on non-education-related unlimited cash payments was brief.208 This portion of the opinion called back again to
O’Bannon: even though suspicions lingered over the NCAA’s amateurism rules, some rules were not too restrictive.209 Accordingly,
the Alston II court accepted the district court’s understanding that
limits on non-education related compensation like unlimited cash
payments and above-COA payments did have procompetitive purposes.210 The Supreme Court’s opinion acknowledged this conclusion on non-education-related benefits as a “wrinkle” in the case,
but not one that offended the analytical process undertaken by the
district court and Ninth Circuit.211 This finding clearly and concisely demonstrated that the NCAA still has an interest in restricting
non-education-related cash payments and benefits and that courts
must recognize that interest.212

(“Given this lack of clarity, the district court reasonably concluded that the NCAA’s
survey results were of limited evidentiary value.”).
207. See id. at 1259–60 (noting restraints on certain education-related benefits
do not preserve demand).
208. See id. at 1257–60 (discussing procompetitive purpose of challenged
rules relating to unlimited cash compensation).
209. See Sheetz, supra note 115, at 879 (discussing O’Bannon’s conclusions that
some NCAA rules still have procompetitive purposes).
210. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257, 1260 (noting compensation limits preventing unlimited cash payments preserve demand, thus serving procompetitive purpose). The court also listed examples of challenged rules with procompetitive
purpose. See id. at 1257 (“The district court concluded, however, that only some of
the challenged rules serve that procompetitive purpose: limits on above-COA payments unrelated to education, the COA cap on athletic scholarships, and certain
restrictions on cash academic or graduation awards and incentives.”).
211. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2162 (2021) (“Even acknowledging this
wrinkle, we see nothing about the district court’s analysis that offends the legal
principles the NCAA invokes.”). When referring to “legal principles the NCAA
invokes,” the Court was referencing the NCAA’s argument that “antitrust law does
not require businesses to use anything like the least restrictive means of achieving
legitimate business purposes.” See id. at 2161-62 (“Simply put, the district court
nowhere—expressly or effectively—required the NCAA to show that its rules constituted the least restrictive means of preserving consumer demand. Rather, it was
only after finding the NCAA’s restraints ‘patently and inexplicably stricter than is
necessary’ to achieve the procompetitive benefits the league had demonstrated
that the district court proceeded to declare a violation of the Sherman Act.”).
212. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1260 (holding NCAA compensation limits relating to prevention of unlimited cash payments preserve demand for NCAA
products).
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c. Ruling Upheld: Ninth Circuit’s Analysis of Student-Athletes’
Less Restrictive Alternative
Continuing with the analysis, the Alston II court considered the
less restrictive alternative stage of the rule of reason—at this stage,
an acceptable less restrictive alternative demonstrates “that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive
manner.”213 The less restrictive alternative considered by the court
“would prohibit the NCAA from (i) capping certain education-related benefits and (ii) limiting academic or graduation awards or
incentives below the maximum amount that an individual athlete
may receive in athletic participation awards, while (iii) permitting
individual conferences to set limits on education-related benefits.”214 In considering the less restrictive alternative, the circuit
court evaluated whether the alternative would be “virtually as effective in serving the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA’s current
rules” and whether the alternative would greatly affect cost to the
NCAA.215
Here, the Ninth Circuit considered the district court’s contemplation of the effectiveness of the less restrictive alternative in preserving the demand for college sports.216 The court again accepted
the district court’s conclusion that the less restrictive alternative
would preserve demand just at the same level as the challenged
rules.217 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the benefits are so connected to education that they are not comparable to professional
salaries, especially given that the value of the benefits is limited to
the actual costs of the benefits provided—meanwhile, a professional salary would not be limited in the same way.218 The Supreme
Court later supported this conclusion, also stating that there was no

213. See id. at 1256, 1260 (discussing rule of reason third step, noting burden
on Plaintiffs to demonstrate viability of proposed less restrictive alternatives including how to identify acceptable less restrictive alternative). For further discussion of
the steps of a rule of reason analysis, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
214. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1260 (discussing less restrictive alternative identified by district court).
215. See id. (acknowledging necessary discussion of effectiveness of less restrictive alternative including effects on cost).
216. See id. (noting discussion of preservation of consumer demand for college athletics).
217. See id. (ruling uncapping education-related benefits would still preserve
consumer demand).
218. See id. at 1261 (stating difference between less restrictive alternative compared to professional compensation).
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evidence that such benefits for student-athletes would hurt demand
for the product.219
The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that allowing competition
related to education-related benefits would “reinforce consumers’
perception of student-athletes as students” given that they are receiving a benefit that only students can receive.220 The court also
explicitly rejected the NCAA’s argument that these uncapped benefits would not be distinguishable from professional salaries.221 It
reasoned that the NCAA was reading the district court’s injunction
too expansively and the context of the injunction demonstrates that
it does not permit any unlimited cash payments but instead is reserved for “non-cash education-related benefits” for “legitimate education-related costs.”222 Thus, when properly interpreting the
injunction and accounting for available evidence, demand is not
negatively impacted by the proposed less restrictive alternative.223
When analyzing less restrictive alternatives, a court may issue
an injunction if it finds that a less restrictive alternative exists.224 In
addressing the issue of cost increases caused by the less restrictive
alternative, the Alston II court quickly determined that the less re219. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2165 (2021) (discussing difference between professional salary versus current NCAA benefits while noting athletic
awards would not adversely impact demand for NCAA competition).
220. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1261 (discussing importance of perceiving student-athletes as students for demand).
221. See id. (stating lack of evidence for NCAA’s claim that less restrictive alternative would lead to student-athletes’ payment being indistinguishable from
professionals’ payments).
222. See id. (quoting Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2019))
(rejecting NCAA argument about threat of student-athlete compensation similar
to professional salaries).
223. See id. at 1260 (concluding uncapped education-related benefits would
not be detrimental to consumer demand). The Ninth Circuit also rejected the
NCAA’s challenge to evidence underlying the less restrictive alternative, stating
that the NCAA failed in explaining why cumulative evidence was insufficient to
support the less restrictive alternative. See id. at 1262 (“The NCAA fails to explain
why the cumulative evidence, which included demand analyses regarding the
growth of NCAA revenue alongside the expansion of SAF and AEF payments for
education-related expenses, was insufficient.”). Finally, the Court considered the
NCAA’s contention that the district court improperly engaged in “judicial price
setting by tying the cap on academic and graduation awards and incentives to the
cap on aggregate athletic participation awards.” See id. (discussing NCAA arguments about judicial price setting). The Court rejected that argument, noting that
the actual responsibility of setting the value of academic awards remains vested
with the NCAA. See id. (“But the district court did not fix the value of these academic awards: The task of setting their value to protect demand, by adjusting the
aggregate value of athletic participation awards, remains in the NCAA’s court.”).
224. See Sheetz, supra note 115, at 877 (describing process of issuing injunction, which O’Bannon proceedings demonstrated).
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strictive alternative would not significantly increase costs.225 The
court agreed with the district court that uncapping education-related benefits would ultimately save the NCAA money and resources by eliminating the need to enforce the caps.226 The court
also stated that there is no reason to believe regulation of academic
awards and education-related benefits would lead to those cost increases.227 Relying on this reasoning, the circuit court stated that
the district court’s findings were “certainly not clearly
erroneous.”228
The Ninth Circuit court did not place a large focus on the district court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive alternative (to uncap all non-education-related cash payments for studentathletes) during its less restrictive alternative discussion but returned to the district court’s conclusion during the injunction analysis.229 Appeals courts do not always accept the less restrictive
alternatives of lower courts, as was the case in O’Bannon.230 Nevertheless, the circuit court accepted the district court’s rejection of
the proposed less restrictive alternative specifically for the non-education-related benefits, reasoning that such payments could negatively impact perception of college sports as unique from
professional sports.231 The circuit court thus declared the limits on
non-education-related cash compensation as “not . . . anticompetitive conduct” and declined to enjoin them.232 Beyond this case, the
NCAA is ready to allow some non-education-related NIL compensation for student-athletes given pressure from state legislation.233
225. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1262 (“The district court did not clearly err in
finding that this [least restrictive alternative] will not result in significantly increased costs.”).
226. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1262 (noting less restrictive alternative would
not lead to much greater costs).
227. See id. at 1263 (stating NCAA’s ability to regulate benefits would not necessarily result in greater costs).
228. See id. (“The court’s findings at step three are supported by the record,
and certainly not clearly erroneous.”).
229. See id. at 1264 (discussing proposed less restrictive alternative to eliminate unlimited cash payment limits).
230. See Sheetz, supra note 115, at 879 (observing O’Bannon court struck down
district court’s remedy, finding it “erroneous”).
231. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1264 (noting demand is preserved by limits on
non-education-related payments).
232. See id. (“Contrary to Student-Athletes’ understanding, this analysis reflects the judgment that limits on cash compensation unrelated to education do
not, on this record, constitute anticompetitive conduct and, thus, may not be
enjoined.”).
233. See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Rushing a Name, Image, Likeness Rule as its Power
Over College Athletics is Quickly Diminishing, CBS SPORTS (May 10, 2021), https://
www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaa-rushing-a-name-image-likeness-
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These state laws will take some power away from the NCAA in placing meaningful limits on this type of compensation for studentathletes.234
3.

A Slam Dunk: Affirming The Alston I Injunction Amidst NCAA
and Plaintiff Opposition

Moving to the injunction, the circuit court considered the
NCAA’s contention that the injunction went too far as well as the
student-athletes’ contention that the injunction did not go far
enough.235 The court ultimately ruled that the district court’s carefully crafted injunction did well to provide remedy for Plaintiffs
while preserving demand for Defendants.236 Therefore, they affirmed the injunction as is.237 The Supreme Court later took the
same stance, preserving the district court’s original injunction.238
The injunction was therefore properly structured to only enjoin
NCAA restrictions on education-related benefits available to student-athletes.239
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the NCAA alleged that the injunction issued against it was too vague and interfered with the “association’s role as the ‘superintend[ent]’ of college sports.”240 The
rule-as-its-power-over-college-athletics-is-quickly-diminishing/ [https://perma.cc/
S86G-H96Z] (noting NCAA president’s recommendation to approve NIL legislation for college athletes before July 1, when related state legislation would otherwise take action).
234. See id. (explaining how implementation of NIL rules has been taken out
of NCAA’s hands, meaning future NCAA attempts to limit student-athlete NIL
compensation “could bring more legal action”).
235. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1263 (“The final question remaining is whether
the district court’s injunction goes too far or not far enough in enjoining the
NCAA’s unlawful conduct.”).
236. See id. (“[T]he district court struck the right balance in crafting a remedy
that both prevents anticompetitive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the
procompetitive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports.”).
237. See id. (“Thus, we neither vacate nor broaden the injunction, but
affirm.”).
238. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021) (holding district court’s injunction was “within the law’s bounds” in part because district court did not “f[a]ll
prey to [the] temptation” to meddle in business affairs beyond normal judicial
review).
239. See id. at 2153 (“Enjoining the NCAA’s restrictions on these forms of
[education-related] compensation alone, the court concluded, would be substantially less restrictive than the NCAA’s current rules and yet fully capable of preserving consumer demand for college sports.”).
240. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1263 (recounting NCAA’s challenge to injunction). In alleging the injunction was too vague, the NCAA believed the injunction
was in violation of Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (“In
the NCAA’s view, the injunction is impermissibly vague, in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) (“Rule 65(d)”), and usurps the association’s role as
the “superintend[ent]” of college sports.”).
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Alston II court rejected the NCAA’s challenge, declaring that the
injunction did not meet the necessary standard for being struck
down—that is, it was not “so vague that [it has] no reasonably specific meaning.”241 The court reasoned that the injunction was reasonably specific given that it used exact language and particular
examples of enjoined behavior.242
The circuit court then addressed the issue of whether the injunction takes control of the association’s own rules out of the
hands of the NCAA.243 Here, the court concluded that the injunction did not result in “judicial usurpation” and did not give courts
control over NCAA rules.244 The court reasoned that the injunction did not give power to courts but rather left control with the
NCAA for defining what constitutes “related to education” and
merely subjected that definition to subsequent approval by
courts.245 Justice Gorsuch’s Supreme Court opinion would eventually agree with this assessment, applauding the district court’s judgment for “stand[ing] on firm ground” behind “an exhaustive
factual record, a thoughtful legal analysis consistent with established antitrust principles, and a healthy dose of judicial
humility.”246
While the Alston II court concluded the injunction was not too
broad and did not go too far, it also had to consider Plaintiffs’ crossappeal that the injunction did not go far enough and “should have
enjoined all NCAA compensation limits.”247 The court rejected this
241. See id. (stating injunction could not be struck down as vague).
242. See id. (advocating context of injunction while recognizing examples
listed with injunction provide reasonable specificity). The NCAA was not confused
by the injunction enjoining NCAA limits on “compensation and benefits related to
education.” See id. (explaining NCAA’s position on injunction). However, the association did claim that the “injunction’s reference to other tangible items not
included in the [COA] but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies”
was too vague under Rule 65(d). See id. (stating NCAA’s opinion regarding injunction’s specifics). The court rejected this argument, stating that reading the injunction in context with the list of examples of education-related equipment
demonstrated the language of the injunction was “reasonably specific.” See id.
(“When read in context, following a list of specific types of education-related
equipment, this language is reasonably specific.”).
243. See id. (discussing NCAA’s challenge of injunction for seizing control
over NCAA by courts).
244. See id. at 1263–64 (holding injunction did not usurp NCAA’s control
over its own rules).
245. See id. (explaining NCAA has power to define what is related to education but court gets final approval on definition).
246. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021) (stating district court’s judgment was not judicial usurpation).
247. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1263 (acknowledging cross-appeal by Plaintiffs
for stronger injunction).
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argument by the student-athlete Plaintiffs, reasoning that the NCAA
carried its burden of demonstrating procompetitive justification for
rules prohibiting unlimited payments unrelated to education and
the proposed less restrictive alternative to enjoin all compensation
limits would not preserve those procompetitive effects.248 At the
Supreme Court level, the Plaintiffs did not renew their challenges
to NCAA restrictions not enjoined by the original injunction, “confin[ing] [the Supreme Court’s review] to those restrictions now enjoined.”249 The Alston II court also rejected the Plaintiffs’
arguments that the NCAA had endorsed NIL benefits of non-education-related cash payments through changes to rules following
O’Bannon; the NCAA had merely altered its rules to comply with
O’Bannon.250
B. Garbage Time for The Bench Unit: Reviewing the
Concurrence
A concurring opinion was issued in Alston II by Ninth Circuit
Judge Milan Smith, who joined the majority panel in full but wished
to express concern over expansion of the rule of reason that seems
to be occurring in antitrust law (and actually harming student-athletes’ protections under antitrust law).251 In particular, Judge
Smith noted that the treatment of student-athletes going largely uncompensated for their labor and talent is not the result of free market competition but rather “the result of a cartel of buyers acting in
concert to artificially depress the price” student-athletes might otherwise receive.252 Judge Smith also criticized the tendency of courts
to expand consideration of procompetitive effects beyond the limits
of the market at issue.253 Here, the consideration of procompeti248. See id. at 1264 (“As previously stated, the district court concluded, at step
two, that the NCAA satisfied its burden of showing that ‘[r]ules that prevent unlimited payments’—‘unrelated to education’ and ‘akin to salaries seen in professional
sports leagues’—serve the procompetitive end of distinguishing college from professional sports.”).
249. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2154 (“For their part, the student-athletes do
not renew their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions. Accordingly, we do not pass on the rules that remain in place or the district
court’s judgment upholding them.”).
250. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1265 (stating Plaintiffs’ argument NCAA has
endorsed non-education-related cash payments is premature).
251. See id. at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring) (explaining concerns over state of
antitrust law).
252. See id. at 1267 (Smith, J., concurring) (explaining student-athletes’ treatment in their market is result of behavior meant to be prohibited by antitrust law).
253. See id. at 1269 (Smith, J., concurring) (“Realistically, the Rule of Reason
analysis is judicially administrable only if it is confined to the single market identified from the outset. If the purpose of the Rule of Reason is to determine whether
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tive effects was not limited to the student-athlete services market
but instead also considered the effects on demand outside of the
market.254 Ultimately, Judge Smith warned that this “cross-market
Rule of Reason analysis frustrates the very purpose of the antitrust
laws” and stated that there is no justification pronounced for the
shift to cross-market analysis.255
V. GOING

BOOTH: REPLAYING THE DECISION
OFFERING CRITICAL ANALYSIS

TO THE

AND

This Section analyzes and critiques the logic, reasoning, and
conclusion of the circuit court in Alston II.256 The Ninth Circuit
never actually addressed the circuit split that existed during the litigation, as it accepted and relied upon the ruling and findings from
O’Bannon.257 This absence of discussion of the circuit split and issues regarding commercial nature and procompetitive presumptions was consistent with the O’Bannon opinion and followed the
custom of stare decisis.258 The issues of whether the market was
commercial or whether NCAA rules should be presumed to be
procompetitive were already settled by the Ninth Circuit, so they
did not need to be addressed in this instant case.259 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit properly declined to analyze those issues again by not
addressing them anywhere in the opinion.260
The critique begins by considering the court’s determinations
regarding res judicata and stare decisis.261 The conclusion by the
court in this part of the analysis was straightforward and easily una restraint is net procompetitive or net anticompetitive, accepting procompetitive
effects in a collateral market disrupts that balancing.”).
254. See id. at 1269–70 (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing rule of reason analysis
went beyond labor market identified by student-athlete Plaintiffs).
255. See id. at 1270–71 (Smith, J., concurring) (suggesting rule of reason analysis going beyond labor market seems to go against purpose of antitrust laws, especially considering cross-market analysis was detrimental to student-athlete Plaintiffs
in this case).
256. For further discussion of a critical analysis of Alston II, see infra notes
257–282 and accompanying text.
257. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244 (declaring O’Bannon as standard to follow).
258. For further discussion of the circuit split and analysis of the split, see
supra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
259. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064–65
(9th Cir. 2015) (advocating rules must be proved to be valid, not presumed valid).
For further discussion of O’Bannon, see supra notes 149–161 and accompanying
text.
260. See generally Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239 (accepting O’Bannon’s ruling on
these matters).
261. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of stare decisis and
res judicata, see supra notes 171–184 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

39

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

74

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 35

derstood, as the court noted that stare decisis could not foreclose
the litigation because of material factual differences between the
instant litigation and the previously decided O’Bannon.262 However,
the court reasoned that the situation was factually different in a material way because the NCAA had relaxed its compensation limits in
the wake of O’Bannon; now that the compensation limits were more
relaxed during Alston II than what they were during O’Bannon, the
facts of Alston II were sufficiently different from O’Bannon to support new litigation.263 This reasoning, however, implies that the
NCAA’s response to the O’Bannon ruling made it susceptible to subsequent litigation on similar issues.264 Nevertheless, the reasoning
is logically sound and consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s prior
O’Bannon decision and the Supreme Court’s statement in Leegin
Creative Products regarding the fact specific nature of antitrust
cases.265 The recent relaxation of the rules means they are different from the O’Bannon litigation.266 The circuit court’s reluctance
to apply res judicata and the effect of allowing the claim was likewise logically sound given the court’s reasoning; it does not make
any sense to preclude a claim arising from events that occurred after O’Bannon closed.267
Moving to the court’s rule of reason analysis, the first step of
the rule of reason analysis was logical and straightforward, considering that the NCAA did not dispute that the rules at issue had “significant anticompetitive effects” in the market for student-athlete
skills.268 No dispute meant the end of the analysis for step one.269
262. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1254–55 (indicating NCAA conceded instant
litigation was factually different from O’Bannon litigation previously decided).
263. See id. (“Additionally, the NCAA’s concession that it has relaxed its compensation limits since O’Bannon only underscores that the instant litigation is materially factually different from O’Bannon.”).
264. See id. (stating relaxation of NCAA compensation rules differentiated instant case from O’Bannon).
265. See id. at 1253 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)) (explaining need for fact-sensitive nature of antitrust
litigation).
266. See id. at 1253–55 (stating relaxed rules are “materially factually different” from previously unchanged rules).
267. See id. at 1255–56 (explaining claim preclusion cannot apply when claims
at issue were not in existence when prior action was settled).
268. See id. at 1256–57 (discussing anticompetitive effects of NCAA rules, specifically recognizing lack of challenge by NCAA to this finding). This finding by
the circuit court did not analyze the anticompetitive nature of the NCAA rules but
rather accepted the district court’s findings on the matter. See id. (accepting district court findings, relying on record from district court). For further discussion
of rule of reason analysis steps, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
269. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1256–57 (concluding first step is settled because
of lack of dispute). Because the NCAA did not dispute the district court’s finding
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However, the second step of the rule of reason analysis was more
analytical for the Ninth Circuit and likewise more open to critique.270 The court had accepted all of the district court’s findings
on demand analyses, survey evidence, and NCAA testimony—and it
was correct to do so as it needed to rely on the record from the
district court.271 Ultimately, the circuit court’s methods for analysis
and conclusions on this issue were consistent with its prior decision
in O’Bannon and consistent with the record of the instant case.272
While this step of the rule of reason analysis was consistent with
the prior decision of O’Bannon, the concurrence included in Alston
II raised valid criticisms of the analysis.273 The main point of contention—that the step two analysis of procompetitive effects went
beyond the defined market—argues effectively that the current rule
of reason analysis is flawed.274 This demonstrates inconsistency in
the way that the Alston II court carried out the rule of reason analysis given that the first step of the analysis was confined to the defined market but the second step examined the procompetitive
effects beyond the market.275 The concurring judge also noted that
this exception for the second step of the analysis disadvantages
plaintiffs like the student-athletes and likewise “frustrates the very
purpose of the antitrust laws.”276 Because antitrust law is meant to
“[outlaw] only unreasonable restraints” on trade as they arise, this
version of the rule of reason analysis does seem to frustrate the
law’s intent because it gives more leeway to unreasonable restraints—such as NCAA rules.277 Given this apparent conflict beat this stage, there was no longer a dispute over this issue; it makes sense for the
circuit court not to spend time doing more analysis. See id. (“These findings ‘have
substantial support in the record’ . . . and the NCAA does not dispute them.”).
270. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s rule of reason second step
analysis, see infra notes 271–278 and accompanying text.
271. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257–58 (determining acceptance of district
court’s findings based on record).
272. See id. (stating importance of record in making decision).
273. For further discussion of Judge Smith’s concurrence, see supra notes
251–255 and accompanying text.
274. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1268, 1270–71 (Smith, J., concurring) (discussing rule of reason analysis while arguing step two of analysis typically goes beyond
defined market).
275. See id. at 1256, 1257–59 (majority opinion) (stating anticompetitive effects identified must be in relevant market but noting procompetitive effects relate
to demand for NCAA’s amateur sports product).
276. See id. at 1266–67, 1271 (Smith, J., concurring) (stating cross-market rule
of reason analysis done in second step goes against purpose of antitrust law).
277. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885
(2007) (explaining Supreme Court’s ruling Section 1 of Sherman Act bars only
unreasonable restraints).
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tween the steps of the analysis and whether this analysis upholds
antitrust law’s intent, the reasoning by the Alston II majority at that
stage in the analysis, though sound, is not as powerful as other parts
of the opinion.278
In addressing the injunction, the Ninth Circuit held that the
injunction did not go too far because it did not take any power away
from the NCAA to define what constituted something “related to
education”—though the court then had to approve the NCAA’s
definition.279 This injunctive relief presents a straightforward issue
that the NCAA reasonably challenged: the court has the final say
over the definition so the court seemingly has control over the definition.280 While this appears problematic at first glance, this portion of the injunctive relief is still consistent with the rest of the
court’s opinion because it recognizes the duty of courts to preside
over trade restraints and prevent unreasonable restraints.281 Moreover, given that the action was brought by Plaintiffs whom were
harmed by the conduct of the NCAA, it is necessary to carry out the
injunctive relief granted for the Plaintiffs to the fullest extent possible; if the court did not monitor the NCAA’s adjustments following
the ordered injunction, there would be no guarantee that the restrictive behavior would be corrected.282
VI. WHAT ARE THE VEGAS ODDS ON FUTURE LITIGATION AND
HOW CAN I BET ON THAT?: ASSESSING ALSTON II’S (AND
THEREFORE ALSTON III’S) IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit’s Alston II decision will immediately impact
U.S. antitrust law, as the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
case and issued an opinion in June 2021.283 Following a unanimous
decision by the Supreme Court affirming the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court resolved the circuit split previously mentioned in
278. For further discussion of a rule of reason criticism, see supra notes
268–278 and accompanying text.
279. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1263–64 (noting court left power over NCAA
definitions with NCAA but definition is subject to court approval).
280. See id. (noting court’s power to approve (or disapprove) of NCAA’s definition of what relates to education).
281. See id. (stating vesting of control in NCAA subject to court approval is not
“judicial usurpation by a long shot”).
282. For further discussion of the injunction issued, see supra notes 235–250
and accompanying text.
283. See Alston Petition, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct.
1231 (2020) (No. 20-512) (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. The case is consolidated, and a
total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.”). See generally Alston III,141 S. Ct.
2141 (2021).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss1/2

42

Nowak: Student-Athletes' Push for Compensation: Analyzing the Impact of

2022]

STUDENT-ATHLETES’ PUSH

FOR

COMPENSATION

77

this Note in Alston III.284 Indeed, the Court settled whether the
NCAA is commercial and under the restraints of the Sherman Act,
indicating that the NCAA is in fact commercial in nature.285 The
Supreme Court’s decision likewise clarified the Board of Regents
dicta about the “ample latitude” the NCAA needs for rule-making,
indicating that the NCAA shall not receive any procompetitive presumption for its compensation rules.286 Nor shall courts “reject all
challenges to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions” according to
the Supreme Court opinion.287
The Supreme Court’s decision on the case is surely impactful,
but it is what is written in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston II
and the district court’s decision in Alston I that gives important
takeaways for antitrust law.288 First, the Ninth Circuit’s two holdings in the case must be considered.289 The narrowest holding in
the case was the ruling on the injunction; by affirming the district
court’s injunction, the Ninth Circuit applied the injunction only to
the challenged rules in the case and refused to enjoin additional
NCAA rules.290 Despite its short reach, this holding in Alston II
greatly impacts the NCAA as it mandates a change in rules and disallows caps on education-related benefits for student-athletes at
NCAA member universities.291 Commentators likewise believe that
the amateurism model of the association is threatened by this deci284. See generally Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166 (affirming both district court’s
holding in Alston I, Ninth Circuit’s affirmation in Alston II). For further discussion
of the circuit split, see supra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
285. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2158–60 (rejecting NCAA’s argument that its
member schools are not commercial enterprises).
286. See id. at 2158 (noting Board of Regents court was merely “assuming the
reasonableness of the NCAA’s restrictions” rather than declaring them procompetitive). For further discussion of Board of Regents and NCAA-related antitrust litigation, see supra notes 103–161 and accompanying text.
287. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2158 (“Board of Regents may suggest that courts
should take care when assessing the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation, sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these remarks do not suggest that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions.”).
288. For further discussion of Alston II’s impact, see infra notes 289–323 and
accompanying text.
289. For further discussion of Alston II’s holdings, see supra notes 168–282,
290–300 and accompanying text.
290. See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1263–64 (9th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging
appeal by Plaintiffs for stronger injunction but rejecting Plaintiffs’ request). For
further discussion of the court’s injunction, see supra notes 235–250 and accompanying text.
291. See Alston I, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1109–10 (N.D.Cal. 2019) (noting district court’s decision that education-related benefits for student-athletes beyond
COA cannot be limited).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

43

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

78

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 35

sion.292 The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the injunction creates
greater tension regarding the NCAA’s amateurism model.293
The second Alston II holding is implicit and refers to the Ninth
Circuit’s faithfulness to its prior O’Bannon decision.294 The implicit
holding has two layers: rules must be proved to be valid, not presumed as such, and rules regulating an exchange that is a “quintessentially commercial” can be considered commercial in nature
despite their “anti-commercial” intent.295 By accepting the
O’Bannon decision’s findings on both of these points, the Alston II
court further cemented the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Board
of Regents and how NCAA rules should be treated under antitrust
law.296 This holding was broad in that it can apply to all NCAA
rules challenged before a court; the procompetitive nature of rules
must be proven and the commercial nature of rules can be recognized despite facially anticompetitive purposes.297 The Supreme
Court’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit opinion further confirmed
this holding.298 Alston III made clear that the procompetitive presumption previously recognized by some circuits was not declared
by the Board of Regents Court—NCAA rules, particularly compensation rules, are not immune from antitrust litigation.299 Alston III
serves as a clarification for Board of Regents and alludes to future
NCAA antitrust litigation given its affirmation of Alston II’s broad
holding.300
Even if the Supreme Court had never reviewed this case, Alston
II would still be impactful.301 The holdings of the court—in partic292. See Ramsey, supra note 53 (noting Alston II’s threat to NCAA’s amateurism model).
293. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166 (2021) (holding district court’s injunction was “within the law’s bounds”).
294. For further discussion of Alston II’s continuation of O’Bannon, see supra
notes 257–260 and accompanying text.
295. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064–66
(9th Cir. 2015) (noting stance against procompetitive presumption; discussing
presence of commercial nature despite anti-commercial intent).
296. For further discussion of O’Bannon, see supra notes 149–161 and accompanying text.
297. See Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting faithfulness to O’Bannon in current analysis). For further discussion of O’Bannon holdings, see supra notes 154–155, 159–160 and accompanying text.
298. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166 (affirming judgment of Ninth Circuit).
299. See id. at 2163 (noting Board of Regents dicta about NCAA rulemaking did
not cement NCAA compensation restrictions as procompetitive).
300. For further discussion of Alston III’s clarification of Board of Regents, see
supra notes 294–299 and accompanying text.
301. For further discussion of Alston II’s impact without Supreme Court review, see infra notes 302–314 and accompanying text.
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ular the previously mentioned implicit holding—would create a
more apparent circuit split.302 Nothing regarding the circuit split
was resolved in Alston II; instead, the Ninth Circuit stood its ground
and maintained its understanding of Board of Regents by relying
heavily on the reasoning and analysis presented in O’Bannon.303
Given the allegiance to O’Bannon by the Alston II court, the Ninth
Circuit already seemed set on this stance and subsequent litigation
of related issues in that jurisdiction would be doubly bound to the
O’Bannon analysis.304 Still, given the unwillingness to preclude the
instant litigation given the difference in facts from O’Bannon, the
Ninth Circuit’s Alston II opinion makes clear that each distinct set
of facts will warrant its own analysis.305
Alston II’s impact on other jurisdictions was speculative pending the Supreme Court review, inferring some takeaways when considering the makeup of the rest of the circuit split.306 Before Alston
III, Alston II served more as a confirmation of O’Bannon than a new
Board of Regents interpretation so the current balance of opinions
among the circuits was not changed.307 The Seventh Circuit still
had a procompetitive presumption for NCAA rules focused on amateurism, courtesy of the Agnew decision.308 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit and Third Circuit both maintained their respective stances that
antitrust litigation regarding NCAA eligibility rules could not go
forward because those rules are not commercial in nature.309 Alston
302. For further discussion of the court’s implicit holding, see supra notes
294–297 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the circuit split, see
supra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
303. See generally Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing O’Bannon
repeatedly for guidance in antitrust analysis); see also id. at 1266 (Smith, J., concurring) (noting binding effect of O’Bannon decision on Ninth Circuit in Alston II).
For further discussion of Board of Regents, see supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text.
304. See Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1244 (discussing need for antitrust analysis to be
faithful to O’Bannon).
305. See id. at 1253–1255 (explaining factual differences between O’Bannon
versus Alston II while highlighting importance of “case-by-case adjudication” when
factual differences exist). For further discussion of Alston II’s stare decisis and res
judicata analyses, see supra notes 171–184 and accompanying text.
306. For further discussion of Alston II’s impact on other jurisdictions, see
infra notes 307–314 and accompanying text.
307. For further discussion of circuit split, see supra notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
308. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 341–43 (7th
Cir. 2012) (establishing procompetitive presumption for NCAA regulations meant
to preserve amateurism). For further discussion of Seventh Circuit’s Agnew, see
supra notes 124–131 and accompanying text.
309. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir.
2008) (stating NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules are not commercial); see also
Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 185–86 (3d Cir. 1998) (hold-
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II did not even comment on these rival decisions because the Ninth
Circuit was basing its analysis off of the trail that O’Bannon had
blazed.310 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its rebuke of the other circuits but declined to disagree any further with those circuit
courts.311 The effect of this silence was unclear but realistically
could have impacted other jurisdictions in two distinct ways: (1)
other circuits would have continued thinking nothing has changed
since O’Bannon given that Alston II does not elaborate on the analysis, or (2) other circuits would have viewed Alston II as strengthening O’Bannon’s analysis.312 The first possibility was addressed
earlier by this Note in the discussion of O’Bannon’s binding effect
on Alston II.313 The second possibility was previously hinged on a
balancing act between the different circuit courts involved in the
circuit split; Alston II gave the O’Bannon analysis another leg to
stand on when considering the views of competing circuits.314 Now,
the Supreme Court opinion in Alston III eliminates the circuit split
regarding the NCAA’s purported procompetitive presumption and
non-commercial nature.315 To that extent, Alston III establishes
how to properly review antitrust litigation pertaining to the
NCAA—a fact that will be important in future suits.316
Alston II and Alston III may also have an impact that goes beyond time in court when considering the emergence of pay for play
ing eligibility rules do not fall under Sherman Act because they are not commercial). For further discussion of Bassett, see supra notes 132–138 and accompanying
text. For further discussion of Smith, see supra notes 139–148 and accompanying
text.
310. For further discussion of Alston II’s close following of O’Bannon, see supra
notes 257–260 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066
(9th Cir. 2015) (indicating O’Bannon court was not convinced by Smith or Bassett
decisions—O’Bannon’s court stated Bassett’s reasoning was “simply wrong”).
312. For further discussion of two possible impacts of Alston II’s silence on the
former circuit split, see infra notes 313–314 and accompanying text.
313. For further discussion of Alston II being bound by O’Bannon, see supra
notes 257–260, 297, 303–304 and accompanying text.
314. For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, see supra notes
124–131 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Sixth and Third
Circuits’ reasoning, see supra notes 132–148 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, see supra notes 149–161, 168–250 and
accompanying text.
315. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158–59 (2021) (asserting NCAA did not
earn procompetitive presumption for its compensation restrictions, declining to
agree with NCAA’s position that NCAA is not commercial).
316. See id. at 2166 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating Supreme Court’s Alston III majority decision “marks an important and overdue course correction” to
prevent NCAA from avoiding future antitrust scrutiny).
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laws in some states.317 While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston
II and Supreme Court’s decision in Alston III do not offer significant ground to student-athletes in the push for NIL compensation
or non-education related compensation, they do push the issue and
attack the NCAA’s amateurism model.318 Given the Ninth Circuit’s
view on eligibility rules being subject to antitrust review and its
somewhat blunt rejection of the NCAA’s appeal, other student-athlete plaintiffs may be inclined to strike the iron while it is hot in
more antitrust litigation against the NCAA.319 Likewise, the Supreme Court’s affirmation of Alston II and the further success of the
student-athlete Plaintiffs may encourage future antitrust suits
against the NCAA.320 Beyond the scope of the courtroom, states
may also see the judiciary’s stance as a jumping-off point for additional pay for play legislation.321 Recently, the association has made
concessions on some rules; for example, the NCAA announced that
it would let players receive NIL compensation back in October of
2019.322 Alston II and subsequent litigation may provide additional
pressure to the NCAA that could result in even more changes to
current amateurism rules.323
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Alston III demonstrates the
potential for future litigation, even highlighting an expectation that
judicial treatment of the NCAA will be corrected in favor of proper
317. For further discussion of pay for play laws, see supra notes 162–167 and
accompanying text.
318. See Ramsey, supra note 53 (discussing Alston II’s impact on NCAA’s amateurism model, including fact that Alston II does not take away NCAA’s ability to
restrict non-education related benefits).
319. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz, New Name, Images, Likeness Lawsuit Against NCAA
Could Put Hundreds of Millions of Dollars at Stake, USA TODAY (June 15, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/06/15/ncaa-lawsuit-overathletes-images-likeness-puts-big-money-stake/3189283001/ [https://perma.cc/
LKF8-CRKF] (discussing suit filed in June 2020 to place additional pressure on
current NCAA rules surrounding student-athlete compensation, particularly regarding NIL compensation).
320. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2165–66 (majority opinion) (mentioning importance of NCAA amateurism debate but also limitation on judiciary to only review issues brought in litigation while affirming Ninth Circuit’s Alston II
judgment).
321. See Norlander, supra note 5 (discussing prospective NIL legislation in
states).
322. See Jabari Young, The NCAA Will Allow Athletes to Profit From Their Name,
Image and Likeness in a Major Shift for the Organization, CNBC (Oct. 29, 2019), https:/
/www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/ncaa-allows-athletes-to-be-compensated-for-namesimages.html [https://perma.cc/W8N9-PEQJ] (discussing unanimous vote by
NCAA’s governing board to allow student-athletes to be compensated for NIL).
323. See Berkowitz, supra note 319 (noting increase in tension surrounding
student-athletes about NIL profitability); see also Ramsey, supra note 53 (noting
Alston II’s impact on NCAA amateurism model).
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antitrust scrutiny.324 Specifically, Kavanaugh’s concurrence noted
that “the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also raise serious
questions under the antitrust laws.”325 Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh criticized the “circular theory” the NCAA used to justify its
amateurism rules, namely that not paying student-athletes is a “defining characteristic of college sports.”326 Kavanaugh accurately
states that “[t]he NCAA is not above the law,” a quote that will resonate with many future plaintiffs.327 While Kavanaugh’s concurrence has no binding legal impact, his words and analysis could
drive other suits.328
In addition to the likelihood of future litigation on the issues
of amateurism and NCAA rules relating to student-athletes, questions loom over what the federal government will do in response.329
With state pay for play laws on the horizon, it stands to reason that a
federal law could be next.330 Given the country-wide nature of
NCAA activities, Congress may decide to oversee this area directly
by using its power to regulate interstate commerce.331 Many Con324. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[W]ith
surprising success, the NCAA has long shielded its compensation rules from ordinary antitrust scrutiny. Today, however, the Court holds that the NCAA has violated the antitrust laws. The Court’s decision marks an important and overdue
course correction, and I join the Court’s excellent opinion in full.”).
325. See id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (suggesting future consideration of
other NCAA compensation rules may be inevitable).
326. See id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (criticizing NCAA’s justification for not paying student-athletes).
327. See id. at 2169 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining how NCAA is not
exempt from antitrust law).
328. For further discussion of Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion and its
impact, see supra notes 324–327 and accompanying text.
329. For further discussion of the federal government’s possible action, see
infra notes 330–335 and accompanying text.
330. See Rudy Hill & Jonathan D. Wohlwend, College Athletes Now Allowed to
Earn Money from Use of Their Name, Image, and Likeness, NAT’L L. REV. (July 1, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/college-athletes-now-allowed-to-earnmoney-use-their-name-image-and-likeness [https://perma.cc/N35K-NYFB] (discussing possibility of federal NIL legislation including reviewing previously introduced federal NIL bills that did not get passed).
331. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (“The Congress shall have power to . . .
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.”); see also
David Cruikshank, Comment, The Fair Pay to Play Act: Likely Unconstitutional, Yet
Necessary to Protect Athletes, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 253, 264–65 (2020) (suggesting
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act would fail against possible dormant commerce
clause challenge because it impermissibly burdens interstate commerce); Commerce
Clause, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause
[https://perma.cc/XD46-XJWH] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021) (“The Commerce
Clause has historically been viewed as both a grant of congressional authority and
as a restriction on the regulatory authority of the States.”). In concluding that
state laws like California’s are likely unconstitutional, Cruikshank proposes that
federal action is necessary to protect student athletes “from the exploitative prac-
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gressmembers have voiced support for a federal NIL bill and payment of student-athletes.332 Moreover, Alston III demonstrated
some level of judicial animosity for current and past NCAA rules
circumventing the law.333 Even the NCAA has adopted an interim
NIL rule, but is seeking federal legislation in order to eliminate the
dysfunction that it believes different state laws will cause; notably,
this new rule adoption occurred about a week after Alston III was
decided.334 With all of this preexisting and burgeoning support for
student-athletes, the Alston decision could very well be the beginning of a revolution against the NCAA as we know it.335
VII. NO OVERTIME TONIGHT: CONCLUSION
Even before Supreme Court review, the Ninth Circuit opinion
stood as another victory for NCAA student-athletes and their opportunities for compensation.336 Limitless education-related compensation is not exactly what most student-athletes have been lobbying
for, but it is a starting point.337 As states continue to pass NIL compensation laws that favor student-athletes, it seems NCAA compensation and eligibility rules will inevitably become friendlier to
tices of the NCAA.” See Cruikshank at 265 (footnote omitted) (“Federal action is
required to ensure athletes continue to be protected from the exploitative practices of the NCAA, as state protections like California’s Fair Pay to Play Act are
likely unconstitutional. Currently, the best way to protect athletes would be federal
legislation allowing them to enter into sponsorships and similar arrangements with
third parties, enabling them to profit from the use of their NILs.”).
332. See Hill & Wohlwend, supra note 330 (noting Senator Mitch McConnell’s
past statements about necessity of federal NIL bill); see also Sally Jenkins, The College
Sports Debate Comes to Capitol Hill, Athletes Not Invited, WASH. POST (June 8, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/06/08/congress-ncaa-nil-senatecommerce-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/783Q-DNRK] (discussing past efforts at
federal legislation proposed by Senators Roger Wicker, Jerry Moran, Chris
Murphy).
333. See Alston III, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166, 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (declaring how Alston III decision was “overdue course correction” while criticizing NCAA’s justification for maintaining strict amateurism rules).
334. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (June 30, 2021), https://
www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2021-06-30/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-imageand-likeness-policy [https://perma.cc/M4J3-E4LJ] (noting NCAA adopted policy
only as “interim solution” while “work[ing] with Congress to adopt federal legislation to support student-athletes.”); see also Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2141 (noting case
was decided June 21, 2021).
335. For further discussion of already existing support for student-athletes,
see supra notes 5, 162–167, 329–332 and accompanying text.
336. See Ramsey, supra note 53 (discussing Alston II’s result prohibiting NCAA
from limiting education-related benefits for student-athletes).
337. See id. (noting Alston II still allows NCAA limitations on non-education
related benefits for student-athletes).
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student-athletes as well—even though the NCAA has not responded
to the pressure as strongly as some state legislators expected.338 Following Alston III, the circuit split no longer lingers.339 Through the
Alston II decision, the Ninth Circuit had made clear its stance that
NCAA rules are subject to review under the Sherman Act.340 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s unanimous agreement with the Ninth
Circuit is dispositive; ultimately the O’Bannon framework—later
used in Alston I and Alston II—received the blessing of the Supreme
Court for future antitrust litigation.341
Matthew Nowak*
338. See Dellenger, supra note 166 (“The NIL blitzkrieg is thundering through
the halls of state capitol buildings across the country.”). New Jersey State Senator
Joseph Lagana spoke about New Jersey NIL law’s intent in “get[ting] the NCAA to
act” while noting NCAA has not responded quite as expected by legislator. See id.
(discussing push to move up NIL law’s effective date as response to NCAA’s failure
to act adequately). For further discussion of state pay for play laws, see supra notes
163–167 and accompanying text.
339. See generally Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2157–59 (majority opinion) (confirming Ninth Circuit’s understanding of Board of Regents classification of NCAA’s position as commercial in nature). For further discussion of the circuit split, see supra
notes 115–161 and accompanying text.
340. See generally Alston II, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020) (accepting O’Bannon
decision’s conclusions on commercial nature of NCAA eligibility rules including
unwillingness to grant procompetitive presumption to NCAA amateurism rules).
For further discussion of Alston II’s holding that NCAA rules are subject to review
under the Sherman Act, see supra notes 257–260, 294–300 and accompanying text.
341. See generally Alston III, 141 S. Ct. at 2166 (affirming Ninth Circuit’s Alston
II decision). For further discussion of affirmation of O’Bannon, see supra notes
257–260, 294–300 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the O’Bannon
decision, see supra notes 149–161 and accompanying text.
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